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INTRODUCTION 
And is anything more important than that 
the work of the soldier should be well 
done? 
Plato, The Republic 
For those unfamiliar with the profession of arms, 
and for those unacquainted with strategic thinking, the 
subject matter of this sub-thesis might seem at first to be 
unnecessary. If 'strategos' is 'the art of the general' 
then must it not follow logically that the Australian 
military profession is able to understand and help determine 
and implement strategy? Alas, seldom are things so simple, 
even if they appear so on the surface. Clausewitz 
recognised this when he noted that war was simple, but that 
1n war even the simple things are difficult. As this sub-
thesis endeavours to show, strategic thinking, although 
complex simple, 1s actually a diverse and seemingly 
discipline. It is like medicine to the doctor, or research 
to the academic, or mathematics to the accountant in the 
sense that it has many aspects, all of which are not equally 
important to all members of the profession. 
Yet strategic thinking should be seen as a link that 
helps bind and largely distinguish the military profession, 
just as medicine, research and mathematics help distinguish 
doctors, academics and accountants. Often this is not 
realised and it is common to read or hear of other traits 
that distinguish the military profession. 
its distinctive appearance, its use 
1 
These may include 
or potential use 
• 
of organised force, its corporate spirit, its strong 
allegiance to the state, its customs and traditions, or even 
its fighting ethic. However, in reality all of these traits 
form part of strategy, because ultimately they all help 
explain how the armed forces contribute to national security 
in peace and in war. 
Although a number of studies concerning the Australian 
military profession have been conducted in recent years none 
have (to this author's knowledge) addressed specifically the 
relationship betwen strategy and the Australian military 
profession. The most thorough analysis of officer 
development yet conducted in Australia was the Report of the 
Australian Army's Regular Officer Development Committee 
(RODC) (1978). However, the RODC Report was concerned with 
examining the career progression of Army officers and was not 
tasked to look at the other services. Moreover, its terms 
of reference were so broad as to preclude any specific 
examination of the place of strategic thinking in the 
military profession. 
In 1984 Major General Butler (retired) was commissioned 
to review the development of senior officers in the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF). Butler perceived that there 
was an absence of tradition in strategic thinking in the ADF, 
but he did not explain exactly what he meant by this, or why 
this situation existed. Moreover, his terms of reference 
restricted him from analysing the entire officer profession 
and, consequently, his recommendations were concerned only 
with how senior officers could be better prepared for high 
2 
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office. 
that 
This sub-thesis does not contest Butler's perception 
strategic thinking within the Australian military 
profession is inchoate, but it goes further than either 
Butler or the RODC Report in examining the relationship 
between the Australian military profession and strategic 
thinking. Chapter l explains the meaning of strategic 
thinking and states why strategy is important for the 
Australian military profession. Chapter 2 examines one 
aspect of strategic thinking in detail - namely military 
strategy. This chapter attempts to explain the complex 
nature of military strategy and the contribution required by 
the Australian military profession. In chapter 3 the reasons 
for the current state of strategic thinking in the profession 
are explained, and the role and content of military education 
in strategic matters is examined. Finally, chapter 4 looks 
to the 'future' and suggests institutional ways in which 
strategic thinking in the profession may be enhanced. 
Two final points of clarification need briefly to be 
mentioned. The first concerns the term 'the military 
profession', and the second relates to the role of the 
civilian in matters of strategy. The term 'military 
profession' as used throughout the sub-thesis applies 
specifically to the Australian military officer. This is 
not meant to imply that Australian servicemen and women other 
than officers are not part of the Australian military 
profession; for in numbers they form most of the profession 
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and without them there would not be a profession. However, 
the sub-thesis is concerned with the officer group because 
they represent the executive branch of the profession: it is 
the officers who must make the decisions and who are held 
responsible for those decisions. 
Concerning the role of the civilian in strategic 
matters it needs to be emphasised that it is not the 
intention of this sub-thesis to suggest that strategic 
thinking is, 
profession. 
particularly 
or should be, the sole province of the military 
The civilian community in general, 
the civilian bureaucrat involved in 
formulation and implementation of strategic policies, 
and 
the 
have 
legitimate and necessary roles to play. It could be argued 
that those civilians engaged in strategic assessment and 
force structure determination also need to analyse how civil 
careers in strategic matters need to be managed and 
developed. However, this sub-thesis is not intended to 
serve that purpose, although it may help to shed some light 
on that subject along the way. 
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CHAPTER l 
THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC THINKING 
The strategist is like a surgeon called upon to 
operate upon a sick person who is growing 
continuously and with extreme rapidity and of 
whose detailed anatomy he is not sure; his 
operating table is in a state of perpetual 
motion and he must have ordered the instruments 
he is to use five years before hand. (1) 
, 
Andre Beaufre, 1965 
Beaufre's lucid analogy of the problems confronting the 
strategist indicate that strategy is a complex subject with 
which to grapple. Yet for anyone interested in matters of 
national and international security an understanding of some 
strategy lS essential. In his seminal work, 
The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939, E.H. Carr explained that 
the threat or use of military power was an essential feature 
in international politics. Carr realised the importance of 
strategy and noted that: 
if every prospective writer on 
international affairs ... had taken a 
compulsory course in elementary 
strategy, reams of nonsense would 
have remained unwritten. (2) 
However, 
insufficient. 
even a course 1n elementary strategy would be 
Strategy needs to be studied and lived with if 
it is to be understood, and even then the doyens of 
international politics and national security are forced to 
operate in an atmosphere of considerable uncertainity. The 
5 
• 
reason for this is because strategy is the product of human 
endeavour. It is possible (albeit increasingly difficult) to 
assess the potential and limitations of a country's military 
power, but this assessment (though of vital importance) is 
only part of strategy. Of more importance and of greater 
difficulty is an understanding of the human motives behind 
these capabilities. Thus, strategy is an art more than a 
science because it is concerned essentially with human 
decisions and only uses the established rules and methodology 
of science to help in this process.( 3 ) It is for this reason 
that Beaufre concluded: 
that in strategy, as in all human 
affairs, it is ideals which must be the 
dominant and the guiding force. (4) 
This chapter attempts to answer two questions: 
What is strategic thinking? 
And in strategic thinking what role should the 
Australian military profession play? 
What is Strategic Thinking? 
acquire. 
An understanding of strategy is not easy to 
Partly this is because 'strategy' is an ambiguous 
word, as can be seen from the numerous definitions and 
descriptions in Appendix 1. 
when they noted that: 
Schwarz and Hadik were correct 
There are thousands of definitions of the 
strategy. They vary in time and place 
term 
and 
to according to the emphasis the author wants 
give to one or other aspect. (5) 
6 ~ 
Even when related to the issue of 
security the word strategy needs qualification. 
national 
Do we mean 
by strategy the way the government intends to achieve 
national security; or more specifically the way in which 
national resources are to be marshalled; or the way the 
armed forces are to be structured and employed; 
in which alliances are, or are not, to be formed; 
or the way 
or all of 
these things and more? Beaufre explained that once national 
objectives are determined (what he called 'policy'), a 
national or 'total' strategy was required which embraced all 
the areas of national administration. He recognised at 
least four areas (political, economic, military and 
diplomatic), each of which had its own 'overall strategy' and 
which contributed towards national security. 
( 6 ) 
explain this pyramid of strategy. 
Diagram l helps 
In as much as it concerns national security, 
strategy involves the coordination of national strategy and 
the 'overall strategies'. But this process is both two-way 
and continuous. In one direction national strategy sets the 
framework within which each of the overall strategies must 
operate, namely the goals which they seek to achieve. But 
in the opposite direction, and occurring simultaneosly, each 
of the overall strategies helps national strategy to be 
formulated by forecasting and demonstrating what the nation 
realistically can achieve and how it can operate in each of 
these areas. Moreover, this process is continuous because by 
necessity coordination and liaison must continue within and 
between these areas both to achieve and to validate the goals 
7 ~ 
of national strategy. 
Diagram 1: The Pyramid of Strategy 
( National objectives providing 
POLICY .....•...•......• ( framework within which strategy 
( operates. 
( Alternatively 'total' or 'grand' 
NATIONAL STRATEGY .....• ( strategy. The general way in 
OVERALL 
POLITICAL 
STRATEGY 
( which the nation is to avoid 
( and if necessary conduct war. 
OVERALL 
ECONOMIC 
STRATEGY 
Strategic thinking 
OVERALL 
MILITARY 
STRATEGY 
not only 
OVERALL 
DIPLOMATIC 
STRATEGY 
requires the 
consideration of these facets of national security but, more 
importantly, the derivation of a suitable course of action to 
be followed. As Bernard Brodie has explained: 
Strategic thinking ... is nothing if not pragmatic. 
Strategy is a "how to do it" study, a guide to 
accomplishing something and doing it efficiently. 
As in many other branches of politics, the 
question that matters in strategy is: Will the 
idea work? (7) 
Beaufre was of the same opinion. He believed that: 
Strategy is not a single defined doctrine; it is 
a method of thought, the object of which is to 
codify events, set them in order of priority and 
then choose the most effective course of action.(8) 
8 
Beaufre went further. He agreed with Ferdinand Foch's 
notion that 
( 9) 
strategy, 
'freedom of action' was a universal rule of 
and in a subsequent book, Strategy of Action 
( 1967), explained the various 'characteristics', 'levels' and 
'modes' of action that were available to nations. Most 
importantly Beaufre stressed that 'action is the sword which 
( l O) 
can both strike and parry': a positive strategy 'when you 
( l l ) 
wish to achieve something'. 
In determining the most favourable (or at least the 
most rational) course of action the strategist must seek 
( l 2 ) 
answers to three fundamental questions: 
What is the nature of potential conflict? 
How can such conflict be controlled? 
How should such conflict be prepared for? 
This means that at the very highest level of strategic 
thinking the strategist must be capable of sifting the 
essential elements from each of the overall strategies and 
melding these to form a national strategy that is both 
credible in the present day and relevant for the forseeable 
future. At this level the strategist's task is complicated 
further because of the need to constantly 
strategy to policy - the 'means' to the 'ends'. 
subordinate 
In theory, 
policy should lighten the load on the strategist by 
providing clear guidance as to the ends required. But 1n 
9 
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practice 
strategists 
policy 1s often ambiguous, demanding from 
an awareness of the numerous disciplines, 
organisations and people which combine to form it. 
Bull has explained: 
Hedley 
art. 
... the concepts of contemporary strategic 
thinking - notions such as deterrence, crisis 
management, limited war, insurgency, arms control 
- are no more than a series of variations on 
Clausewitz's theme of the need to subordinate war 
to the political object .... Unfortunately, 
however, Clausewitz's does not have anything to 
say to us as to what the political object of war 
should be. This is why the strategy should not 
ever be allowed to become separated from study of 
international politics, international law and 
international ethics. (13) 
Strategic thinking, therefore, 1s a multidisciplined 
In so far as strategic thinking is concerned with the 
consideration and solution of problems it shares also common 
(14) 
ground with tactics. 
with the preparation, 
But whereas strategy is concerned 
planning, equipping and deployment of 
military forces, normally on a large scale and over a 
considerable period, tactics is concerned with the manoeuvre 
and employment of military units normally within a specific 
( l 5 ) 
geographic area and/or for a specific purpose. The naval 
strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan saw the distinction between 
tactics and strategy in more simple terms: strategy 
involved getting the force to the scene of battle at the best 
time and 1n 
the battle 
the best shape, 
( 16) 
itself. Of 
while tactics was the conduct of 
course, distinctions between 
strategy and tactics are not always clear. It is possible 
to cite historical examples where essentially tactical 
encounters have had an enormous effect on strategy - Admiral 
10 
41 
( l 7) 
Halsey's decision at Leyte Gulf in 1944, and General 
Giap's efforts at Dien Bien Phu in 1953-54 and later during 
( l 8 ) 
the Tet Offensive in 1968, come quickly to mind. Equally, 
quite small tactical forces can be controlled from the 
highest political level either to achieve a strategic victory 
or to 'signal' an adversary so as to enhance the attainment 
of national security objectives - the United States naval 
quarantine of Cuba in 1962 perhaps could be interpreted in 
( l 9 ) 
this way. 
Nevertheless, despite these grey areas between strategy 
and tactics, it is true that the strategist must think 
constantly on a much higher level than the tactician. 
Tactical solutions need to be found quickly, the better for 
innovative and original thought, but are mainly arrived at in 
a procedural manner: or as Brodie has noted, 'tactics are •.• 
(20) 
more easily taught by precept and experience.' However, 
strategic solutions are more difficult, requiring the same 
clear headedness, but depending upon greater understanding, 
breadth of vision, selection of the key issues, and 
foresight. The military maxim 'look after the little things, 
( 21) 
and the big things will look after themselves,' has 
relevance in tactics, but in strategy the reverse will 
normally apply. 
What Role Should the Military Profession Play? 
The scope of strategic thinking is so vast and requires 
so much study that it seems at first to be beyond the 
11 
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responsibility of the military profession. If the military 
profession is to be competent on the field of battle (or 
to deter battle), then little time remains for the military 
profession to ruminate on the complexities of strategy. Yet 
ruminate it must if the military is to be influential in the 
determination of strategy as well as in its execution. 
Thus, the crux of the problem for the military profession is 
how to fulfil these different roles - the strategic and the 
tactical - in a competent manner. 
Huntington saw the military as three 
responsibilities to the state - executive, 
having 
advisory and 
representative ( 22 1 all of which can be related to strategic 
thinki ng . The executive role is concerned with the 
implement a tion of strategy. In conflict it is symbolised by 
victory or defeat, but it is a reactive role and has nothing 
to do with the determination of strategy. It is possible to 
argue that if military strategy is the means rather than the 
ends of policy then the military merely should be told what 
to do, and get about doing it: rather like a mechanic is 
instructed to fix a motor car, or a surgeon to remove 
tonsils, or an appointed historian to write an official 
account of an important event. But in fact nothing is quite 
so simple. We would consider our mechanic remiss if he was 
not to ivise us on how the motor car could be fixed; the 
surgeon removing the tonsils also performs a diagnostic 
function, giving professional advice about what should be 
done; and the historian, though given the subject on which 
to write, inevitably will inject to some extent his/her own 
( 23) 
predilections in the official account. The same is true of 
12 
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strategy. Generals can hardly be told to deter, prepare 
for, and if necessary fight battles, about which they have 
not formed ideas; and it seems logical that these ideas 
should be considered as part of the decision-making process. 
This is the second of Huntington's roles, the advisory role. 
The third or representative role concerns the image or 
profile the military presents in offering advice on strategic 
matters. It represents the military's foray into the 
political arena and includes its relations with the media and 
( 24) 
various lobby groups in order to strengthen its claims. 
Largely for the reasons explained in Chapter 3 the Australian 
military profession has tended to concentrate on its 
executive role and generally has given scant attention to its 
advisory and representative roles. Consequently, the 
Australian military profession has until recently shown only 
modest incentive to develop its own strategic thinking and 
has contributed little in the determination of national and 
military strategy. 
The role of the military in the determination of 
strategy can be compared with that of the civilian. Hedley 
Bull succinctly explained the situation in the United States, 
which has relevance to Australia, when he observed that: 
The military profession today is far from having 
vacated the field of strategy .... But ... the 
civilian experts have made great inroads. They 
have overwhelmed the military in the quality and 
quantity of their contributions to the literature 
of the subject .... They increasingly dominate 
the field of education and instruction in the 
subject ..•. And most prominently in the United 
13 
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States, the civilian strategists have entered the 
citadels of power and have prevailed over military 
advisers on major issues of policy. (25) 
The increased influence of the civilian sector 
relative to the military in the determination of strategy 
can be justified on the basis that the complex nature of 
strategy (already referred to) demands inputs from a variety 
of sources concerned with national security. 
Brodie was referring to when he noted that 
This is what 
war is not only too important to be left to the 
generals but too important and far too complex to 
be handled adequately by any one profession. (26) 
Brodie undoubtedly was correct and the pyramid of strategy 
itself implies that many sections of Austalian society 
contribute to the formulation of strategy in some way or 
other - government and cabinet, the armed forces, the public 
service, industry, various interest groups, and ultimately 
the electorate. However, T.B. Millar has shown that the 
phrase 'civil-military relations' 
is all too frequently misinterpreted as appearing 
to refer either to relations between the armed 
forces and the public, or between the armed forces 
and the public service. (27) 
Millar states that the phrase more accurately reflects the 
relationship between military leaders and cabinet. Thus, 
if one accepts Millar's interpretation, it can be argued that 
in the determination of strategy the military profession has 
14 
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a definite role to play - certainly not the only influence in 
the determination of strategy, but a distinct and direct 
influence none the less. However in Australia it would 
appear that the military (and, arguably, cabinet) has 
subordinated the importance of this special relationship with 
government to its relationship with the public service. If a 
criticism is to be levelled at the Australian military 
profession it would not be that they have obstructed the 
influence of the civilian bureaucracy in the formulation of 
strategy, but rather that the military has given too much 
responsibility to the bureaucrat too easily. If Brodie can 
complain that in the United States often too much emphasis in 
the determination of strategy is placed on 
( 28) 
'military 
experience' and 'military judgement' then the argument that 
military training and experience count for nothing is equally 
invalid. 
In Australia national strategy is based mainly on 
Australian Security Outlook (AS0)( 2 ihd military strategy 
the 
on 
the ASO's derivative the Strategic Basis of Australian 
Defence Policy (Strat Basis).( 3 0)Public information on these 
documents is sketchy. However, it would appear that 
although the military has an input to both documents, and 
that although the military has representation on the higher 
defence committees which consider the Strat Basis,( 3 l)the 
major responsibility for their preparation rests with 
· · . . . . ( 3 2) 
c1v1l1an 1ntell1gence and defence officers. 
15 
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In Australia the prime interest of the military in 
relation to strategy has tended to rest more in the area 
of equipment proposals 
replacement materiel), 
(predominantly in the way of 
and in the area of tactics where 
organisational structures and operating procedures have been 
continually monitored and refined often using the Strat Basis 
( 33) 
as justification. Particularly since the amalgamation of 
the three Service Departments into the Department of Defence 
(1973-76) / the military profession has contributed only 
modestly in determining the rationale for the force structure 
(34) 
and modus operandi of the ADF. In this respect the 
military generally has been reactive to the determinations of 
civilian defence officers and the ideas of a small group of 
( 3 5 ) 
academics, rather than developing and proposing coherent 
military strategies in concert with national objectives. 
Indeed, part of the problem faced by the military has been 
the apparent lack of clearly defined national objectives and 
priorities as guidelines within which to work, and the 
tendency for the three services to compete against each other 
(36) 
for their allocation of the defence budget. Yet in spite 
of these problems it remains valid that strategic thinking is 
important for the military profession for three main 
reasons: 
if military advice is to have credibility as 
part of the strategy-making process; 
if operational concepts, force structures and 
materiel options are to be adopted which 
16 
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truly support national strategic objectives; 
and if the military profession wishes to 
stay abreast of developments in the methods by 
which armed forces may be utilised, 
requirements to do this successfully. 
and the 
The Australian military profession lacks a tradition in 
strategic thinking. It is disappointing but noteworthy that 
(and unlike in most other professions) Australian servicemen 
(and women) have contributed little to strategic thinking. 
Even dismissing the immortals like Clausewitz, Mahan and 
Liddell Hart, the Australian military profession can not 
boast much in the way of strategic thinkers in the vein of 
Fuller, 
Hackett, 
or Beaufre, or Eccles, or Wylie or Sokolovskiy, or 
( 3 7) 
or Zumwalt. Australia has produced its fair 
share of capable commanders - among these Monash, Chauvel, 
( 3 8) 
Blarney and Scherger - but by and large Austalia's strategy 
has been accepted and borrowed from overseas, and implemented 
without much intellectual challenge as to its suitability. 
The reasons for this are discussed more fully in Chapter 3, 
but part of the explanation has to do with the intellectual 
character of the profession, which would seem to be a 
universal phenomenon and not peculiar to Australia. In 
considering mainly the British military profession Michael 
Howard has explained that it is 'difficult for the military 
to absorb, encourage, and nuture outstanding original 
( 39) 
thinkers in their midst.' And Rear Admiral Wylie has 
commented about the American military profession that 
17 ~ 
In not having a conscious and analytic 
appreciation of their own patterns of thought, the 
military minds in too many cases are restricted to 
the limits of their intuitive thoughts, that, 
after a lifetime of largely technical training, 
are perhaps somewhat narrower than they might be.(40) 
The universal problem for the military profession is to 
somehow stimulate intellectual debate about the relevance of 
current strategic doctrine, but at the same time implement 
with precision the very strategy that is under question. 
However, by necessity performance ranks higher than thought, 
and normally those officers rise to the top who devote most 
of their attention to the application of military principles 
(41) 
rather than to the study of strategy. The strategic 
thinkers within the Australian military profession are yet to 
emerge: their emergence will depend on the willingness of 
the profession to recognise the importance of strategic 
thinking; and the effect these officers will have on 
national and military strategy will depend equally on the 
willingness of the profession to encourage and nurture them. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to explain that strategic 
thinking covers a broad and complex range of topics all of 
which contribute to national security. The threat or use of 
military force is an important element of strategic thinking, 
and in determining the most favourable course of action (ie 
strategies) the profession has an important role to play. 
However, in Australia the military profession has tended to 
be reactive to strategic decisions and has not emphasised its 
18 ~ 
advisory and representative responsibilities to help 
formulate strategic concepts and policies. The reasons for 
this are explored in Chapter 3, but are also part of a 
universal phenomenon in which military professions seem 
reluctant to promote intellectual thought concerning the 
relevance of existing military practices. 
The development of strategic thinking and its future 
direction within the Australian military profession are the 
subjects of Chapters 3 and 4 (respectively). However, 
before these are examined attention needs to be given to the 
nature of military strategy, which forms part of strategic 
thinking and is so important to the profession of arms. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
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strategy as art/or science. Among others refer: 
Beaufre (note 1), p.46 et seq; Robert O'Neill 'An 
Introduction to Strategic Thinking', in Desmond 
Ball (ed), Strategy and Defence. Australian 
Essays (George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, London, 
Boston, 1982), pp.29-31; Bernard Semmell (ed), 
Marxism and the Science of War (Oxford Press, New 
York, 1981), pp. 3-12; Harriet Fast Scott (ed), 
Soviet Military Strategy by V.D. Sokolovskiy, 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
l O. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Marshal of the Soviet Union (Macdonald and 
London, third edition, 1968), pp.xvii-xviii, 
Janes, 
5-25. 
Beaufre (note 1), p.138. 
Urs Schwarz and Laszlo Hadik (eds), Strategic 
Terminology (Praeger, New York, Pall Mall, London, 
1966), p.94. 
Beaufre (note 1), pp.30-32. Beaufre does not 
include policy at the top of his pyramid, nor does 
he show the pyramid diagramatically. 
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (Cassell, London, 
1954), p.452. 
Beaufre (note 1), p. 13. 
ibid, p.34. Foch 
universal principles, 
force'. 
actually believed in two 
the other being 'economy of 
~ . Andre Beaufre, Strategy of Action (Faber and 
Faber, London, 1967), p. 28. 
ibid, p. 27. Beaufre saw 'action' as a 
strategy which included deterrence, 
deterrence by itself he saw as a more 
strategy having value in only certain 
strategic nuclear) situations. 
complete 
whereas 
negative 
(mainly 
These questions have been adapted from Julian 
Lider, Military Theory. Concepts, Structure, 
Problems (Gower, Aldershot, 1983), pp. 14-15. 
Lider contends that military thought is 
characterised by three, and possibly a fourth, 
question(s): (1) what is war? (2) How is war to 
be won? (3) How should war be prepared for? 
(4) How can war be prevented? 
Hedley Bull, 'Of Means and Ends', in Robert 
O'Neill and D.M. Horner (eds), New Directions in 
Strategic Thinking (George Allen and Unwin, 
London, Boston, Sydney, 1981), p. 280. 
There are numerous definitions of tactics. 
Australian Joint Service Glossary, (Part 1), 
(AS) 10l1A-r ( 3 November 1981), defines tactics 
'a. The employment of units in combat. 
The 
JSP 
as 
b. The ordered arrangement and manoeuvre of 
units in relation to each other and/or to the 
enemy in order to utilize their full 
potentialities.' (p. 1.255) 
The US Army Field Manual, Operations FM 100-5 
(Washington, D.C., 20 August 1982),defines tactics 
as 'the specific techniques smaller units use to win 
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15. 
16. 
l 7. 
18. 
19. 
2 0. 
21. 
battles and engagements which support operational 
objectives'. (p.2.3) 
It can be argued that ships, aircraft and missiles 
are not restricted to a geographic area in the 
sense that ground forces are. This is true, but 
nevertheless at the tactical level the point of 
contact or area of engagement is normally 
restricted. 
Cited in Brodie (note 7), p. 438. 
At Leyte Gulf in October 1944 Admiral Halsey made 
a tactical decision to concentrate his force and 
move north so as to engage a 'decoy' Japanese 
fleet, thus leaving San Bernardino Strait and 
American forces in Leyte Gulf unprotected against 
the 'striking' Japanese fleets. Halsey's decision 
was tactically inept, but the eventual outcome of 
the battle from a strategic point of view was that 
'the Japanese surface fleet was never again able to 
offer a serious challenge to the Allied navies' 
(Refer: Basil Collier, The War in the Far East 
1941-1945. A Military History (Heinemann, London, 
1969), p. 456.) 
The final battle of Dien Bien Phu, May 1954, was a 
tactical victory for Giap. At that time the 
French remained strategically superior in Indo 
China, but the psychological impact of their 
defeat at Dien Bien Phu acted as a catalyst for 
French wihdrawal, thus elevating Giap's victory to 
the strategic level. Similarly the Tet Offensive 
in January 1968 was a tactical defeat for Giap, 
but it's effect in dampening American willingness 
to continue the war effort made it a strategic 
victory for North Vietnam. 
For a thorough account of the various options 
presented to President Kennedy during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of October 1962 see Graham 
T.Allison, Essence of Decision. Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston, 1971). Particularly noteworthy was the 
inability of some senior military (and civilian) 
advisers to appreciate the strategic consequences 
that some of their options (eg 'surgical air 
strike') would most likely have. Kennedy adopted 
a more moderate solution (the quarantine). 
Brodie (note 7), p. 435. 
Infantry Platoon Commander's Aide Memoire (1959), 
Royal Canadian School of Infantry. Cited in J.A. 
English, A Perspective on Infantry (Praeger, New 
York, 1981), foreword. 
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30. 
Samuel P. Huntington. The Soldier and the State. 
The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., fourth edition, 1967), P.72. Refer also J. 
Essex-Clark, lecture on Australian Military 
Strategy (Australian Army Command and Staff 
College, Fort Queenscliff, 1983), pp.8-9. 
Despite Lord Acton's preference for anonymity and 
impartiality in history, E.H. Carr has shown that 
individual interpretation of historical events is 
both unavoidable and desirable. See Carr, What is 
History? (Penguin, 1974). 
Essex-Clark has suggested that the decision in 
1982 not to replace HMAS Melbourne with another 
aircraft carrier was due partly ' to the RAN's 
inability to fulfil its representative role. See 
Essex-Clark (note 22), p.9. 
Hedley Bull, 'Strategic Studies and Its Critics', 
World Politics (July 1968), p. 594. 
Brodie (note 7), p. 473. 
T.B. Millar, 'The Political-Military Relationship 
in Australia', in Ball (ed) (note 3), p.279. 
Brodie (note 7), pp. 471-473. 
The ASO is prepared by the Office of National 
Assessments (ONA) as a result of liaison with 
other government agencies, in particular the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (PMandC), and within the 
Department of Defence (DOD) with the Joint 
Intelligence Organisation (JIO), Strategic and 
International Policy (SIP) Division, and Force 
Development and Analysis (FDA) Division. 
For a brief account of the history and 
shortcomings of the Strat Basis see Desmond Ball, 
'Australian Defence Decision Making. Actors and 
Process', in Ball (ed) (note 3), pp.314-316. For 
an account of the contents of the Strat Basis see 
The National Times, March 30-April 5 1984. For 
details concerning the military input into the ASO 
and Strat Basis see F.A. Medianski, 'The Role----;I 
the Military In Strategic Policy', in Medianski 
(ed), Australian Studies. The Military and 
Australia's Defence (Longman and Cheshire, 
Melbourne, 1979). pp.22-40. For an explanation 
of how the Strat Basis is prepared and considered 
see Defence Review Committee. The Higher Defence 
Organisation in Australia. Final Report (Utz 
Report) (October 1982), Parliamentry Paper No. 
407/1982, pp.50-51. 
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The highest committees are the Council of Defence 
and the Defence Committee, of which the Chief of 
Defence Force (CDF) and the three Chiefs of Staff 
(RAN, Army, RAAF) are members. However, the main 
consideration of the Strat Basis probably occurs 
in the Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) 
where the CDF and Chiefs are members but which 
(like most of the higher defence committees) is 
chaired by a civilian (the Secretary of DOD). The 
Strat Basis may also be discussed in the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee (COSC), of which the CDF is 
chairman. 
Prime responsibility for the preparation of the 
Strat Basis rests with SIP Division (under Deputy 
Secretary B) which liaises closely with PMandC, 
Treasury, ONA and DFA external to DOD, and with 
JIO, FDA and other areas within DOD. These 
organisations are all civilian managed. The 
services comment on the Strat Basis in the latter 
stages of its preparation. 
In 1976 a senior Army officer is reported to have 
said that because the Strat Basis was so general 
it 'can be used to justify the procurement of any 
weapon system.' See T.P. Muggleton, 'An Evaluation 
of the Analytical Infrastructure of Force 
Structure Decision-Making in the Australian 
Defence Department' (B.A.[Hons] Thesis, Department 
of Economics, Faculty of Military Studies, 
Duntroon, 1976), p. 36. 
This statement is not meant to imply that before 
the amalgamation of the three Departments into the 
Department of Defence (1973-76) the services 
contributed more to the determination of strategy 
than now. However, the services were then not 
subordinated to civilian bureaucrats who since the 
amalgamation have come to hold most responsibility 
in the formulation of Australia's strategy. As 
chapter 3 explains, little effort was given to the 
determination of Australia's strategy before the 
1970's. 
The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), 
Research School of Pacific Studies, at the 
Australian National University (ANU) as been the 
most influential academic body in the development 
of Australian strategic concepts. In particular 
the works by T.B. Millar, Robert O'Neill, Desmond 
Ball and J.O. Langtry (some of which are cited in 
the bibliography). 
Refer chapter 2, the 'economic dimension' pp. 
47-48. For a discussion about the difficulty in 
defining clear national objectives (or national 
interests) see, among others, Brodie (note 7), 
chapter 8. It is possible that the Australian 
military has expected too much in the way of 
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39. 
40. 
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clearly defined objectives and, because of their 
absence, has concerned itself more with their 
executive role in relation to strategy. 
The list is illustrative and is not intended to be 
complete. The point is that there is no 
Australian counterpart to these military strategic 
thinkers. It is possible that strategic thinkers 
currently exist within the Australian military 
profession, but too little work has been published 
from which they can be identified publically. 
Again, the list is illustrative and is not 
intended to be complete. 
Michael Howard, 'Military Science in an Age of 
Peace', RUSI Journal (March 1974), p. 4. 
Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, USN, Military Strategy: A 
General Theory of Power Control (Rutgers 
University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
1967), p. 32. 
For an interesting account of why 'commanders' 
rather than 'thinkers' have risen to the highest 
ranks in the United States military profession see 
Brodie (note 7), pp. 479-496. The fact that 
Australia's military history reflects a prodigous 
list of successful commanders but no strategic 
thinkers would tend to support Brodie's ideas. 
24 
CHAPTER 2 
MILITARY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC THINKING 
Strategy, which so clearly affects the course 
of society, is ... a disorganised, 
undisciplined activity (1) [and] some method 
of bringing intellectual order into strategy 
is long overdue. ( 2) 
J.C. Wylie, 19 6 7. 
In an attempt to bring discipline and intellectual 
order into strategy Wylie suggested a general theory that 
could be applied universally. 
( 3 ) 
His general theory rested on 
four assumptions: 'that there will be war'; 'that the aim 
of war is some measure of control'; 'that the pattern of war 
is not predictable'; and 'that the ultimate tool of control 
in war is the man on the scene with the gun'. Unfortunately 
Wylie's attempt carried the seeds of its own failure. 
Wylie's first two assumptions reflected his acceptance of the 
relevance of power politics in international relations - a 
school of thought which has attracted criticism as an 
incomplete explanation of the management of relations between 
( 4 ) 
states. His third assumption emphasised the 
distinctiveness of each conflict situation, thereby causing 
the reader to question the utility of his general theory. 
And of his last assumption Wylie himself expressed 
( 5) 
reservations about its applicability. 
However, if Wylie's solution of a general theory of 
strategy is suspect, his recognition for the need for 
discipline and intellectual thought in matters of strategy 
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would appear to have merit. Strategy is a comple x subject 
- as explained in chapter l - and requires from those who 
determine and implement it a conscious intellectual effort. 
Wylie's contemporary, Admiral Eccles, saw this clearly when 
he noted that there are no easy or ubiquitous solutions to 
strategic problems. Eccles noted correctly that 
Military theory can never be 
or expressed with the precision that we 
theory in the physical sciences. 
expect it to be perfect or permanent. 
rather, of a set of concepts, a 
interrelations of cause and effect. (6) 
formulated 
demand of 
We cannot 
It consists, 
group of 
Strategic thinking is so difficult because it has no 
neat borders to contain it. The pyramid of strategy in 
chapter 1, for example, shows the various elements that 
combine to form national (total) strategy. But Beaufre 
stressed the interrelationship between all these elements and 
suggested the pyramid only to assist understanding and 
explanation. In a similar manner it is possible to analyse 
military strategy. For the military profession military 
strategy is the most vital element in strategic thinking 
because it is with military strategy (as distinct from 
political, economic or diplomatic strategies) that the 
profession mainly operates. 
This chapter attempts to explain military strategy as 
an element in strategic thinking; but as Eccles once noted 
Theory will never solve a military problem; it 
will shed light on it, and it will assist those 
who have responsibility and authority. (7) 
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The fact that so many writers have attempted to explain 
military strategy is evidence of the subject's complexity. 
Thus the explanation which follows is not so much 'right' or 
'wrong' as it is an attempt to help bring some intellectual 
order into a very difficult subject. 
What is Military Strategy? 
Military strategy, or what Michael Howard once called 
'organised coercion',( 8) concerns the preparation and 
employment of the armed forces for peace and for war in 
concert with political objectives.(9) Although military 
strategy most commonly is judged by victory or defeat in war, 
it also plays an active role in deterring or avoiding war. 
Thus, Sun Tzu advised (in his chapter on 'The Attack by 
Strategem') that 'the supreme art is to subdue the enemy 
without 
military 
fighting. ,(lOit should therefore be emphasised that 
strategy does not disappear in the normally longer 
periods of peace that nations like Australia have become 
accustomed to. As long as states continue to maintain armed 
forces, military strategy will be required to determine the 
way in which these forces are to be structured and, if 
necessary, used. 
Perhaps because all strategy is a chosen course of 
action (refer chapter 1) military strategy generally has been 
interpreted by the Australian military profession as the 
means by which military force may be threatened and/or 
applied. This notion is reflected in the JSP definition of 
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military strategy (refer Appendix 1), where stress has been 
given to the potential or actual employment of military 
force rather than to the preparation of these forces for (or 
to deter) battle. In fact the proper handling of military 
forces on the battlefield is an essential part of military 
strategy and the Australian military profession must be 
proficient at it, but it is not the only part. In order that 
military forces may be threatened or used, considerable 
thought also needs to be given to their preparation, and this 
less glamorous area has received less attention by the 
Australian military profession. 
Military strategy, therefore, includes both the 
preparation and employment of military force. However, 
despite this simple explanation military strategy is really 
quite complex and can be seen in three different ways. 
First, it is possible to think of military strategy in terms 
of the levels on which it operates. Second, military 
strategy can be viewed by analysing its various dimensions. 
And third, military strategy can be considered according to 
the types of military alternatives that may be considered 
and/or adopted. 
The Levels of Military Strategy 
Military strategy operates simultaneously on two 
levels: the higher or coordinating level, and the lower or 
operating level. Coordinating military strategy is concerned 
with broad military issues. In coordinating strategy the 
national resources available to support military options, and 
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the broad military options themselves, are examined. This lS 
the level at which military advice is considered as part of 
defence policy-making, and also the level at which military 
policies are made and disseminated downwards to guide the 
preparation of the armed forces. Coordinating strategy is 
concerned with questions relating to the overall organisation 
and structure of the armed forces; the management and sub-
allocation of resources agreed to by government; the advice 
on capability requirement given by the military to civilian 
bureaucrats and to government; the military input to 
mobilisation planning; the conduct of military relations 
with allies; military advice about the development of the 
country's defence infrastructure; and so on. At the 
military coordinating level of military strategy the 
profession should exercise its opportunity to contribute to 
the determination of national and military strategy in 
accordance with the nation's security concerns. Such 
military proposals 
Australia's 'threat 
environment. ,(l 2 ) 
should be realistic 
environment.(11) and 
and 
its 
relevant to 
'operating 
Within the Australian military profession coordinating 
strategy generally has not been seen as part of military 
strategy. This probably has been because the Greek word 
'strategos' - the art of the general - referred originally to 
manoeuvering armed forces so as to gain maximum advantage 
over an enemy. 'Strategos' really refers to what may now be 
called the lower level of military strategy, or operating 
strategy. But without coordinating strategy operating 
29 
~ 
strategy would be stillborn: consequently the former must 
now also be considered an important part of military 
strategy. 
Operating strategy is concerned with the conduct of 
operations on the battlefield, at sea and in the air. It 
involves the planning and conduct of campaigns within a 
specified theatre or area of operations as seen from the 
perspective of the theatre or area commander. This is what 
the Australian Army has in the last few years termed the 
'operational level of war'(,lJ) and it represents the link 
between coordinating strategy and tactics, the latter which 
deals with 'the specific techniques smaller units use to win 
battles and engagements which support operational 
( 14) 
objectives.' In operating strategy the profession must 
have a clear understanding of how armed forces are to be 
prepared and used in battle. This requires from the 
military profession expertise in how the armed forces are 
to be raised, trained, deployed, manoeuvred and cqntrolled. 
It is at this level of military strategy that campaigns are 
won or lost, where theatre or area commanders' reputations 
are made or broken, and where a nation's efforts at 
safeguarding its interests are most crudely tested. 
Together with tactics operating strategy is the 'bread and 
butter' of the military profession, and it is at this level 
that strategists like Jomini, Clausewitz, Fuller and Liddell-
Hart mostly were concerned. 
These two levels of military strategy, and their 
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interrelationship, are shown in diagram 2. 
Diagram 2: The levels of Military Strategy 
military 
advice 
force 
dis-
position 
orders 
of 
battle 
MILITARY STRATEGY 
Coordinating Strategy ..... _ . ____ higher 
military 
policies 
mobilisation 
planning 
I 
common 
influence 
l 
level 
budget etc 
management 
Operating Strategy __ __________ lower 
level 
balance manoeuvre 
of forces 
terrain 
analysis 
command etc 
and control 
Tactics 
From the explanation given above it is clear that a nexus 
exists between the coordinating and operating levels 
of military strategy, and that although each has a discrete 
purpose, 
clearly, 
cannot 
they both largely influence each other. Quite 
military strategists at the coordinating level 
afford the military 
requirements of, 
to close their eyes to 
and actual capabilities at, the operating 
level. To do so would be unrealistic and would serve only to 
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hinder, rather than help, national security. On the other 
hand, military commanders concerned with operating strategy 
cannot afford to develop operational techniques that do not 
utilise force capabilities in the manner intended at the 
coordinating level. To do so would serve only to lessen the 
prospects of fulfilling political objectives. 
It is important that these two levels of military 
strategy be understood clearly by the military profession. 
If they are not appreciated then operating strategy runs the 
risk of being developed in a vacuous way, perhaps reflecting 
trite military principles that may be unrelated and 
unsuitable as part of a coherent national strategy. 
Moreover, if the relationship between the two levels of 
military strategy is not understood then the quality of 
military advice to government, and the influence of the 
military in helping determine a viable national strategy, 
will be limited. 
In the Australian military profession the distinction 
between coordinating and operating strategy has become 
blurred somewhat because at the highest levels of military 
leadership these levels have been melded artificially. The 
CDF and the three Chiefs of Staff are undoubtedly responsible 
for coordinating strategy, for they (and their staffs) 
represent the engine room of the ADF. However, at the same 
time the CDF also commands the ADF, thus making operational 
elements responsible to him. In time of conflict, however, 
it is unlikely that the CDF and the Chiefs of Staff will be 
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able to exercise effective command. As the British found in 
World War 2, and more recently in Malaysia and the Falklands, 
commanders responsible for operating strategy need to be 
appointed for each theatre or area and given as much latitude 
( 15) 
as possible. This pattern is likely to be repeated in 
future conflicts where Australian field commanders will 
report to the CDF who will be concerned primarily (together 
with the Chiefs of Staff) in providing military advice 
to government and in relaying politico-military decisions 
back to the theatre/area commanders. 
For the reasons explained in Chapter 3 a tradition in 
strategic thinking in the Australian military profession 
is not well developed. Accordingly coordinating and operating 
strategy are not understood well or practised properly in the 
Australian military. In coordinating strategy the 
development of military expertise has been constrained both 
by the competition between the services for scarce 
financial resources, and by the authority exercised by 
civilian bureaucrats in determining force structures, 
( l 6 ) 
capabilities and operational concepts for the ADF. In 
operating strategy the military is yet to determine its 
position on how maritime and continental operations are to be 
conducted effectively in the defence of Australia and its 
( l 7 ) 
interests, if necessary free from allied assistance. In 
addition, agreement on a credible force structure and the 
operational command and control apparatus required to make it 
( 18) 
work has proved difficult for the ADF. 
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The Dimensions of Military Strategy 
Military strategy becomes more complex when consider-
ation is given to its various dimensions, 
appear most important (diagram 3)~19) 
of which seven 
Diagram 3: The Dimensions of Military Strategy 
MILITARY STRATEGY 
political operational technological intelligence 
social administrative economic 
(logistic) 
These dimensions have relevance to strategy generally, 
but are considered here in relation to military strategy in 
particular. The political, social and operational 
dimensions are derived from Clausewitz's 'trinity of war' 
wherein he saw success in battle requiring three fundamental 
conditions: political motivation, operational activity, and 
social participation. The administrative (logistic) and 
technological dimensions have origins in the pre-Clausewitz 
era, but are most clearly expressed in the writings of 
Clausewitz's contemporary, Jomini, who favoured the 
scientific approach to warfare. The final two dimensions -
economic and intelligence - have always been part of military 
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strategy, but the demands and effects of modern warfare have 
seen increased importance placed upon them. 
The Political Dimension. Australian military strategy is 
formulated and implemented in accordance with established 
political custom, and its purpose is to fulfil political 
goals. As with all states, Australian military strategy is 
the manifestation of Clausewitz's aphorism that 'war is an 
(20) 
extension of politics by other means.' However, unlike in 
many countries where the military controls the apparatus of 
government, in Australia the military is subordinated to a 
freely elected government and has only limited influence in 
the determination of government policies. As T.B.Millar has 
noted, within Australian society and similar 'mature' 
societies, 
any attempt by the armed forces to intervene in 
government or (in the ultimate) to constitute the 
government would be bound to fail because of the 
fundamental resistance within society at virtually 
every level and by virtually every institution. '(21) 
Largely because of the military's subordination to 
government it is unlikely that Australian national or 
military strategy would be developed, or military action 
taken, simply to achieve military objectives. The threat or 
use of armed force can be decided only partly by the expected 
military outcome: of more importance is the political 
rationale and the long term political effects incurred from 
the threat or use of military force. In other words the 
subordination of military means to political ends always must 
be kept uppermost in the formulation of military strategy. 
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This point is so obvious as to hardly warrant mention, except 
that when one looks at Western history, even in just the 
twentieth century, one is appalled how frequently this tenet 
has been forgotten. For example the carnage on the Western 
Front in World War l illustrated the folly of subordinating 
political objective to military strategy. Here, commanders 
and politicians expended much effort and needlessly wasted 
lives in the obsession to satisfy military objectives which 
brought with them no political advantage. 
In World War 2 the allies' demand for 'unconditional 
surrender' from Germany and Japan is a further illustration 
of the seductive power that military strategy sometimes has. 
It is quite probable, but of course not certain, that Germany 
and Japan may have capitulated much sooner had the allies 
moderated their demands and showed a willingness to restrain 
their use of military force. 
On a different scale, but more relevant to Australia, 
was the conduct of General Blarney's mopping-up operations 1n 
New Guinea in 1944-45. By this time Japanese forces in New 
Guinea and the outlying islands had been totally isolated and 
no longer posed a serious military threat. Australian 
forces were given the by MacArthur to 
neutralise these Japanese 
responsibility 
troops while American forces 
continued their progress to recapture the Philippines. 
However Blarney, backed by the Australian government, chose to 
destroy the enemy when more modest operations would have 
sufficed. The Australian military historian E.G. Keogh was 
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later to comment: 
Politically or strategically, the offensives on 
Bougainville and at Aitape-Wewak served no useful 
purpose. They achieved nothing that could not 
have been achieved at far less cost. (22) 
A more recent example where military strategy and 
political objectives became dislocated was the Vietnam war. 
It is doubtful that the United States (and its allies) could 
ever have achieved a favourable political solution in Vietnam 
through military means. However, if this was possible, 
then it called for the use of massive military force 
(conventional or nuclear) either to fully occupy South 
Vietnam and politically control its population, and/or to 
force the North Vietnamese into total military and political 
submission. The military solution adopted, however, could 
not achieve these ends, and the allies became enmeshed 1n a 
war they were militarily too weak to win, yet militarily too 
strong to lose. 
Western Front 
In a situation somewhat analogous to the 
1n World War 1, allied military strategy 1n 
Vietnam came to concentrate on body counts rather than on 
fulfilling achievable political objectives. The military 
imperatives of the war superseded political realities and 
were justified on spurious grounds of national interest. 
Thus, the political dimension of military strategy is 
the most fundamental dimension of all. Its importance to the 
Australian military is that the profession must have a clear 
understanding of the political ends which they strive for. 
And the lesson that history teaches is that the most senior 
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military representatives must be 
only 
vigilant 
threaten or 
that 
they and their political masters use 
military force in accordance with and in subordination to 
achievable political objectives. 
The Social Dimension. If the political dimension is the 
most fundamental, then the social dimension lS the 
largest and most complicated dimension of military strategy. 
In his trinity of war Clausewitz saw this dimension as the 
potential cause of conflict because human nature brought with 
it the potential for primordial violence, hatred and enmity. 
There is much truth in what Clausewitz had to say, but the 
social dimension of military strategy can be seen in at least 
four more specific ways. 
In the first place the role of the military 1n 
Australian society needs to be understood so that military 
strategy can 
interests. 
be developed in harmony with 
This means that the Australian 
( 2 3) 
society's 
military 
establishment should be politically aware, attuned to the 
needs and concerns of Australian society, and not insulated 
from it by military practices that seek or encourage the 
existence of 'a state - within - a - state'. Traditions and 
rituals have a legitimate place in all professions, but they 
should not be allowed to become so entrenched as to separate 
those professions from the rest of society and, 1n the case 
of the military, to create a military strategy that 1s 
dysfunctional. In this sense, the 'constabulary' concept of 
armed forces, first stated by Morris Janowitz in 1 9 6 0 , would 
seem to have much relevance for the military in a Western 
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democracy such as Australia. 
in chapter 3. 
This point is discussed further 
Secondly, and as Robert Jervis has shown,(24)the 
that potential or actual adversaries have of 'perceptions' 
their opponent(s) are of vital importance in avoiding, 
precipitating and conducting armed conflict. 
psychological aspect of the social dimension. 
This is the 
If Australia 
is told constantly that it faces no discernable threat then 
what psychological effect does this have on the military 
profession? Certainly it is difficult, psychologically, 
to motivate a profession to create a coherent military 
strategy in a threatless environment. In such situations it 
is far easier for the profession to content itself with 
maintaining proficiency in military skills, and rather like 
the fire brigade, hope that their training and equipment can 
quickly extinguish the fire when it occurs and before it gets 
out of hand. 
nonetheless, 
Yet a coherent military strategy is required 
and this psychological barrier must be overcome 
if the military profession is to contribute more positively 
to maintaining national security. There are signs that 
( 2 5) 
efforts are being made by the military in this regard. 
However, largely because of the reasons explained in chapter 
3, the military has expended little effort in thinking about 
and developing its military strategy. 
Thirdly, decisions will need to be made at the 
coordinating level of military strategy which require from 
the profession an understanding of the make-up and character 
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of Australian society. Decisions will need to be made 
relating to such matters as recruitment and retention, 
conditions of service, education and training, personnel 
motivation during prolonged periods of peace, the proportion 
of women (and in what employment) to be included in the armed 
forces, the manpower mobilisation potential of the nation and 
society's willingness to accept partial or general 
mobilisation. 
(full) 
Finally, at the operating level of military strategy 
consideration needs to be given to such questions as the 
proper selection procedures for personnel employment, how to 
prepare in peace for stress in battle during war, and how to 
develop and maintain the two most essential qualities for 
battle, the corporate spirit and the fighting ethic. At 
this level the social dimension is mainly concerned with the 
maintenance of morale, the importance of which convinced 
Montgomery that it should be included as one of the 
principles of war. 
The Operational Dimension. The operational dimension 
of military strategy is the most explicit because it 
represents the nation's ability to defend its interests and 
wage war when necessary. The operational dimension is in 
fact the visible product of the other six dimensions of 
military strategy. Since the raison d'~tre of the military 
is the achievement of success in battle (should deterrence 
fail), the operational dimension is by necessity the most 
vital to the military profession. 
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The importance of the operational dimension has long 
been recognised by the Australian military profession which 
has earned for itself a high reputation in the conduct of 
military operations. 
This reputation has rested largely on its combat 
fighting ability and particularly in its proficiency in 
applying sound tactical principles with discipline and 
expertise. However, in the conduct of military campaigns or 
military operations independent from larger allies, the 
Australian military profession has developed little 
expertise. Perhaps because of its small size and its 
historic affiliation with allies the Australian military 
profession has given scant attention to the problems of 
independent military operations. Some attention is now being 
(26) 
given to this problem within the profession. However, 
generally an attitude prevails in the military that the 
momentous decisions concerning the operational role and 
required capability of the ADF are to be made primarily by 
civilian bureaucrats, many of whom have little or no 
understanding about the practical requirements for the 
( 2 7 ) 
application of military force. In this important dimension 
of military strategy the Australian military profession 
cannot afford to be too deferential to the civilian 
bureaucracy who in time of war will have no responsibility 
for the actual conduct of military operations. It could be 
argued that the Australian military profession needs to be 
more positive in identifying its operational requirements and 
more assertive in submitting these proposals for 
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ministerial and cabinet consideration. 
The Administrative (logistic) Dimension. The administrative 
(logistic) dimension of military strategy relates to the 
nation's willingness and ability to provide and sustain 
military forces with the necessary manpower, facilities 
and materiel to enable them to accomplish specified military 
objectives. At the coordinating level of military strategy 
the administrative (logistic) dimension is concerned with the 
derivation and validation of administrative concepts which 
realistically reflect the nation's available resource 
capacity (including those resources that Australia reasonably 
could expect to acquire from overseas). The ability, or 
inability, to administratively support military operations in 
a variety of contingencies will largely determine Australia's 
military strategy. Australia's traditional reliance on 
allies for administrative/logistic support has meant that 
insufficient attention has been given to the administrative 
(logistic) dimension in the development of Australian 
military strategy. Although defence self-reliance has been 
stated as a prime objective of Australian defence policy for 
( 28) 
more than a decade 
( 2 9) 
only modest progress has been made 
in this area. 
The administrative (logistic) dimension of military 
strategy is no less important at the operating level than it 
is at the coordinating level. Wavell 
administration to be the crux of generalship, 
(30) 
before tactics. Wavell believed that; 
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considered 
coming even 
It takes little skill or imagination to see where 
you would like your Army and when; it takes much 
knowledge and hard work to know when you can place 
your forces and whether you can maintain them 
there. A real knowledge of supply and movement 
factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; 
only then can he know how and when to take risks 
with these factors, and battles are won only on 
taking risks. (31) 
The marshalling of resources on the battle field is an 
essential requirement of military commanders at all levels. 
Generally considered a less glamorous aspect of soldiering 
than the operational dimension, the administrative dimension 
of strategy has been given far less attention in Australia 
than it deserves. Although there is evidence to suggest 
that the importance of logistics has been recognised within 
( 3 2 ) 
the Australian military profession, it is probably still 
true that far less attention is given to preparing officers 
to 'support' battles than to 'fighting' them. Within the 
Australian military profession Eccles's comment (about the 
United States military in the 1960s) that 
Some military men 
Logistic duty may 
their professional 
think that assignment 
mean the kiss of death 
careers, ( 33) 
still has an element of truth today. 
Jomini placed great importance on logistics. 
to 
to 
From his 
experience in, and analysis of, the Napoleonic wars he 
realised that battles and campaigns could not be won without 
sound logistic preparation by the General Staff. 
in logistics 
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He included 
... 
the preparation of all material of war; the 
drawing up of orders for alternative 
contingencies; the ordering of all troop 
movements; the collection of intelligence; the 
organisation of supply and transport; the 
establishment of camps, depots and magazines; the 
organisation of medical and signal services; and 
the provision of reinforcements to the front line.(34) 
Many of these factors have since come to be considered under 
( 35) 
the more general heading of 'administration' and others such 
as 'intelligence' and 'contingency planning' have become so 
important as to merit consideration separate from Jomini's 
conception of logistics. However, the point is that these 
elements are concerned more with preparing for battle, or for 
sustaining the momentum of battle, and are no less important 
to the final outcome than the fighting aspect to which the 
Australian military profession traditionally has given most 
of its attention. 
The Technological Dimension. The technological dimension of 
military strategy has continued to gather momentum as new 
inventions with military applications have proliferated and 
accelerated. The advent of nuclear weapons in the 1940s 
introduced, with a single or a few weapons, unprecedented 
destructive power to warfare. The ability of some powers 
to conduct nuclear war (the exact consequences of which 
remain uncertain, but the devastation of which was proven at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945) caused strategists to 
( 36) 
reconsider the utility of conventional forces. But in 
effect nuclear weapons only added another dimension to 
strategy because conventional weapons technology continued to 
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develop at a pace and beyond bounds imagined at the end of 
World War 2. The development of sophisticated prec1s1on 
guided munitions wh ose terminal destructive effects are 
almost guaranteed,(37) together with enhanced information 
gathering and weapons platforms at sea, in the air, 1n space, 
and on land, has in some respects reduced the gap between 
nuclear and conventional warfare. Moreover, the 
availability of high technology, low cost, low maintenance, 
and simple to operate weapons systems, has helped foster the 
development of unconventional military strategies, and has 
helped spawn a series of asymmetric conflicts since World War 
(38) 
2. 
The effects of technology on military strategy even for 
non-nuclear states such as Australia have been considerable. 
In the Australian military profession the emphasis on 
military technology has been accompanied by an . . 1ncreas1ng 
need for developmental systems and studies. In addition to 
the necessary research and development associated with all 
inventions, military establishments now need to be proficient 
1n such areas as personnel management systems, project 
analysis, organisational structure analysis, 
simulation systems, and financial management, 
training and 
most of which 
are computerised and all of which require high levels of 
education and training. 
In the view of Michael Howard, Western nations 
(particularly the US and UK) have given too much attention to 
the technological dimension of military strategy at the 
( 39) 
expense of the operational and social dimensions. Be this 
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as it may it seems certain that the technological dimension 
will continue to be an important determinant of military 
strategy in the foreseeable future, and an area in which the 
Australian military profession will need to devote a great 
deal of its attention. 
influences strategy 1n two ways Technology 
simultaneously. As Beaufre has explained, strategic ideas 
and requirements set in train technological and developmental 
processes: 
Strategy must ... lay down the aim which the 
inventions of the technicians and the research of 
the tacticians should strive to achieve. Only 
then shall we be able to direct evolution 
into profitable channels .... (40) 
But at the same time Fuller also was correct when he noted 
that technological inventions and tactical innovations force 
themselves upon strategy from the bottom-up, causing in time 
a change to strategic thinking as decision-makers become 
(41) 
convinced of the utility of the new weapon or concept. 
Beaufre and Fuller were both correct, and perhaps the lesson 
for the Australian military profession is to be aware of 
this, and to cultivate at all levels within the profession an 
innovative approach to the application of technology, while 
at the same time instilling in its senior officers the need 
to direct technological research to fulfil 
military strategy. 
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the aims of 
The Economic Dimension. Because nations can man, equip and 
sustain military forces in peacetime only in relation to 
their ability to finance them, economics has always been an 
important consideration in military strategy. However, the 
increased strain on military budgets, caused largely as a 
result of the rate and cost of technological progress and the 
consequent reduction in the useful lifetime of many military 
equipments, together with escalating manpower costs, has 
increased the influence of economics on military strategy. 
Equipment acquisition programmes and organisational 
structures must be scrutinised and financially managed within 
strict budgetary limits. The term 'resource constraint' has 
become a by-word for project managers, as well as for 
operations and training staffs, all of whom must manage 
carefully their financial allocations. The comment by two 
contemporary American strategists concerning the importance 
of finance in determining American peacetime military 
strategy applies equally to Australia. 
noted that: 
Dunn and Staudenmaier 
A credible and realistic military strategy must be 
financially acceptable. A failure to consider 
the financial implications of selected military 
strategies or doctrines could result in the 
creation of a strategy which the ... public will not 
financially support because of its expense. (42) 
Probably no other factor in military strategy causes 
more inter-service rivalry in Australia during peacetime than 
that of budget allocation. Currently, each service provides 
financial estimates for future equipment and facilities 
requirements, and because aggregate expectations usually 
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outstrip available financial resources cuts often have to be 
( 43) 
made to one or more of the services. Bargaining occurs 
continually within a labyrinth of committees, and the 
eventual economic decisions have a direct impact on strategic 
capability because of the acceptance or deferment or 
rejection of projects and/or equipments. More recently 
inter-service rivalry for scarce funds attracted increased 
public attention over the debate as to whether or not the RAN 
should acquire a replacement aircraft carrier (HMS 
The Invincible) for the obsolescent HMAS Melbourne. 
'carrier debate' highlighted the importance of economics as 
part of the determination of the ADF's peacetime force 
structure. However, the carrier debate also showed that, 
when scarce financial resources were available, the three 
services were unable to agree on a unified military strategy 
within budgetary limitations. The RA N 's continued 
insistence on the need for an aircraft carrier was in stark 
contrast to the RAAF's perceived requirements for Australian 
maritime strategy, 
(44) 
between the two. 
while the Army appeared to vacillate 
The economic dimension of military strategy highlights 
the need for close coordination between the services, as well 
as between the military and the civilian administration, and 
signals the requirement for senior military personnel to have 
a sound appreciation of the military options that the nation 
realistically can afford. 
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The Intelligence Dimension. Just as technology has 
increased the influence of economics on military strategy, so 
too has it improved the ability to acquire timely information 
and intelligence. (45) Military intelligence is an essential 
element of military strategy and is vital for the successful 
conduct of military operations and for longer term strategic 
assessments. Commanders and national leaders traditionally 
have sought information about their actual or potential 
adversaries, and normally have devised military strategies on 
their perceived understanding of their enemy's capabilities. 
Thus, there is nothing new in the function that intelligence 
performs in military strategy. What is new, however, is the 
increased importance now placed on intelligence, the means by 
which it is collected, and the consequent necessity to 
develop professional expertise in the intelligence field. 
In time of war, or when war is imminent, the role of 
military intelligence is clear: all efforts are directed 
towards providing information about the capabilities, 
vulnerabilities and intentions of the enemy. However, in 
peacetime, when no discernible threat is evident, emphasis in 
strategic military intelligence is given to monitoring the 
military capabilities of a number of countries; while 
in operational military intelligence a mythical enemy is used 
to practise the collection and utilisation of battlefield 
information. 
It would seem, however, that military intelligence 
(both strategic and operational) has had little influence in 
the determination of Australia's peacetime military strategy. 
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For example, strategic intelligence seems not to have played 
a maJor role in the decisions to acquire the F/A 18 Hornet 
aircraft and to dispose of (and not replace) the aircraft 
carrier HMAS Melbourne. Similarly, at the operating level 
of military strategy the intelligence function (like 
logistics) is normally given less emphasis during military 
exercises than are other aspects such as deployment, 
manoeuvre, and concentration of force. ( 46) 
Commanders at all levels (as well as 
national leaders) 
and early warning. 
recognise the importance of surveillance 
Moreover the acquisition of equipment to 
help provide early warning generally has been given a high 
priority in recent years.( 47 ) Early warning is vital for 
Australia. The country maintains only small defence forces, 
has an undeveloped military-industrial complex, has no 
contingency plans for mobilisation, and has no existing or 
planne~ civil defence organisation to provide local security 
in the event of war.( 4 B) In military operations for all but 
low level contingencies( 49 ) Australian forces are likely to 
have to fight outnumbered and outgunned in the first 
instance. ( 5 0) Battlefield intelligence will be vital to 
operational commanders who may be forced to use small but 
mobile forces in order to achieve surprise, and continue to 
survive in a dispersed mode with limited logistic support. 
Given these conditions it is evident that military 
intelligence is vital to Australia, and to the Australian 
military profession. Yet it is a fact that the services have 
given only modest attention to the development of military 
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intelligence. Commanders, of course, always want to know 
what the enemy will do and consequently are keen to acquire 
capabilities to help find this out. But commanders normally 
have not been intelligence officers, nor is it normally 
expected that intelligence officers will rise to be senior 
commanders. As a consequence only seldom will officers with 
aspirations to one day become generals (or equivalent) choose 
a career in the intelligence field. The cards are stacked 
against the budding officer, and invariably the keener 
graduates will choose, or be encouraged to choose, . . service in 
the more traditional fighting branchesJSl) There is no easy 
solution to this problem, but perhaps if the importance of 
the intelligence dimension in military strategy is recognised 
more clearly by the profession then enhanced career 
opportunities 
might ensue. 
(and encouragement) for intelligence officers 
The Types of Military Strategy 
Although it is important that military strategy should 
be understood according to its levels and dimensions, 
decision-makers must eventually translate these variables 
into actual strategies that are applicable for the situation 
at hand. In other words certain types of military 
strategies are available each of which have distinct 
characteristics. It is the difficult task of the strategist 
to choose from these various types of strategies those that 
are considered most appropriate for the present, and for the 
foreseeable future. The various types of military strategy 
and the more important considerations in selecting these 
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are summarised 1n diagram 4. (These types and 
considerations are explained more fully in Appendix 2.) 
Diagram 4 (and Appendix 2) helps explain the various 
types of military strategy that a state may select, but only 
rarely will one type of strategy be chosen in complete 
isolation from another. More often than not a state will 
structure its armed forces to implement its policies 1n 
various ways, or to protect itself from a variety of possible 
threats. The strategy of the Viet Minh and North Vietnamese 
are often cited as examples of unconventional military 
strategy, but this strategy remained unconventional only 
until they were able to muster the military strength to mount 
conventional operations. The battles at Dien Bien Phu 
(1953-4) and at Khe Sanh (1968) are illustrations of 
Diagram 4: The Types of Military Strategy 
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conventional operations conducted as part of unconventional 
wars. Today, the same 'guerrilla fighters' who eventually 
were successful in unifying Vietnam are themselves organised 
as a conventional army fighting Khmer guerrillas along the 
Thai border. Similarly, if we look at the military strategy 
of the major powers we find that they maintain the military 
capability to conduct nuclear, general and/or limited war, 
and have at times also contested (with varying success) 
( 52) 
unconventional military strategies used against them. 
As well, each of the four types of military strategy 
shown in diagram 4 have their own variants or sub-types. 
For example, 
whether it 
in nuclear strategy there is debate as to 
is possible to fight and win a nuclear war or 
whether any nuclear exchange will escalate to cause mutual 
assured destruction. For general war there is uncertainty 
about the extent to which nuclear and conventional operations 
would be linked, and as to whether the duration of conflict 
would be short or prolonged. For limited conventional 
operations there are no fixed rules about the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of land. air and maritime 
strategies - it seems always to depend on the situation. And 
even for unconventional military strategy (and their 
associated counter-strategies) there are differences in 
methods (eg rural or urban) which cause it to defy singular 
categorisation. 
All of this shows that there exists an endless range of 
strategy types from which nations attempt to select the most 
appropriate for their particular circumstances. The problem 
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of choosing the best strategy is made more difficult because 
of cost and the long lead times required to introduce, and 
make operational, new concepts and weapons systems. In this 
sense strategic concepts and technology are normally ahead of 
operational capability, but it is the latter with which wars 
must be averted or fought. 
When Australia's current military strategy is analysed 
against this backdrop of types and considerations certain 
trends tend to emerge. 
types of military strategy, 
For example, in relation to the 
the ADF concentrates its efforts 
on preparing to fight (if necessary) limited conventional 
wars, with rather less emphasis being given to unconventional 
warfare. In contrast, nuclear warfare and general warfare 
both of which would require an ongoing national commitment to 
prepare for (and against), ~ have not been embraced as pat of 
Australian national or military strategy. Australia for 
instance has not developed or adopted a strategy of 'total 
defence' similar to that in some other countries like Sweden 
. ( 5 3) . . · 
or Switzerland. In relation to some of the considerations 
listed it would appear also that Australia: 
has prefery'ed a strategy of military alliance 
(principally 
neutrality; (54) 
ANZUS) rather than armed 
has advocated a policy of deterrence in favour of 
war fighting, but has not attempted to achieve 
deterrence by adopting a 'total defence' posture;(55) 
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at least since the withdrawal of forces from 
Vietnam has generally prefer/ed indirect to direct 
military strategy; and 
has in general been unable to determine or agree 
on what emphasis or priority should be placed on 
the development of maritime, 
( 56) 
aerospace strategies. 
continental and 
Brigadier J.S.Baker has commented that in times of 
peace or no obvious threat strategy will remain imprecise and 
flexible. Strategy will exist 
only as an amalgam of policies, programmes, party 
political platforms and social ambitions open to 
interpretation by those responsible for the 
formulation of more specific aspects within it.(57) 
Baker provides an accurate explanation of the current state 
of Australia's national and military strategy, but the 
explanation can not condone this situation. There are other 
countries in similar circumstances to Australia that have 
addressed this problem more judiciously - Sweden, Switzerland 
and Singapore for example. The nation has a right to expect 
more from its defence decision-makers than Baker's 
explanation suggests. 
In this difficult task of selecting and developing the 
most appropriate type of strategy for Australia the role of 
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the military profession needs to be considered. In 
Australia the military has tended to take a 'back-seat ride' 
in matters of strategic decision-making. 
advice to government there can be no doubt, 
That they provide 
but this advice 
often reflects single service loyalties and is most often 
reactive in nature~SB) It would seem that many of the 
decisions taken in relation to Australia's military strategy 
are reached by an osmotic process in which proposals are 
filtered through an endless network of committees and sub-
( 5 9) 
committees. Moreover, it is the civilian bureaucrats 
many of whom have no professional experience in and only 
limited understanding about the requirements of preparing for 
and mounting military operations - that currently have most 
(60) 
authority in the defence decision-making process. 
The military must perform three functions if it is to 
be influential in determining and implementing the most 
appropriate military strategy for Australia. First, at the 
coordinating level of military strategy, the profession needs 
to be able to demonstrate its understanding of military 
strategy by assessing the suitability of each of the types 
(and sub-types) available. Without this knowledge the 
military's advice will have little influence with either 
senior civilian bureaucrats or with ministerial and cabinet 
representatives. Moreover, because military strategy is the 
means rather than the ends of policy, clear ministerial 
guidance needs to be given to the CDF, and if necessary the 
CDF must seek ministerial guidance before alternative 
military strategies can be contemplated. 
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Second, in its examination of alternative strategies 
the military needs to be mindful of resource constraints. 
This has been referred to already under the economic 
dimension of military strategy, but there is another type of 
constraint that requires particular attention, namely, the 
constraint of 'time' . In helping determine military 
strategy the profession should be capable of giving 
unequivocal advice about the 'defence preparation time' 
required to implement alternative military strategies. 
While the military can hardly be blamed should 'warning time' 
for a perceived threat prove to be incorrect, it justifiably 
may be accused of irresponsibility for failing to provide 
advice as to the time required to prepare different 
force levels at different states of readiness and 
( 61) 
sustainability. 
Third, in each of the types (and sub-types) of military 
strategy selected, the profession needs to be proficient in 
single service and joint operations (and possibly in combined 
( 62) 
operations as well). Joint warfare has superseded 
single service operations, but expertise and training in the 
latter remains important so as to provide the necessary 
grounding in maritime, continental and aerospace operations. 
Despite the distasteful aspects of single service 'tribalism' 
it remains true that operations are conducted at sea, on land 
and in the air, and while military officers can be taught to 
appreciate all three, most officers will have the time and 
capacity to become expert only in one. However, military 
officers need also to practise single service expertise in a 
5 7 
....... 
I 
I 
i 
joint force environment. Joint force commanders and their 
staffs must be able to cope in this environment, using 
operational procedures that are appropriate and that are 
understood by each service. Largely because of mutual 
ignorance, single service tribalism continues to exist within 
the Australian military profession and has frustrated efforts 
to devise a coherent military strategy. 
(63) 
Progress in joint 
warfare has been slow, perhaps partly because of the 
favourable strategic environment in which Australia currently 
resides, and partly because defence issues usually attract 
little public attention (or political mileage) during 
perhaps peacetime. Given these circumstances it is 
understandable that the military profession, a conservative 
body by nature, should seek to maintain the status quo and 
with it all the traditions and rivalry that distinguishes 
(64) 
each service from the other. 
Conclusion 
Military strategy represents an important part of 
strategic thinking. For the Australian military profession 
it is the most essential area with which they need to be 
familiar if they are to be influential in the determination 
of Australian strategic policy. This chapter has shown that 
a simple definition of military strategy (refer page 27) 
fails to explain how military strategy is determined or what 
it encompasses. However an understanding of the levels, 
dimensions and types of military strategy goes some way 
towards doing this. This chapter may help bring to strategy 
a degree of that 'intellectual o rder' which Wylie correctly 
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assessed was so desperately required. At the very least it 
may help provide a kind of check list against which the 
military profession can assess its knowledge and expertise in 
military strategy. Using this conceptual approach diagram 5 
illustrates the various elements of military strategy and 
shows how they contribute to national strategy and policy. 
Brodie commented once that 
military strategy, while one of the most ancient 
of the human sciences is at the same time one of 
the least developed. ( 65) 
He went on to explain that this was because the practitioners 
of military strategy were by necessity men of decision and 
(66) 
action rather than theory. This chapter is of course 
theoretical and perhaps justifiably may be dismissed by the 
military as providing little guidance for the practical 
problems likely to confront commanders on the battlefield. 
But perhaps as well as the knowledge so essential for 
commanders to fight successfully is the requirement for them 
also to understand, more fully than hitherto, the rationale 
for preparing for (and averting) war. Only then will the 
military's voice be likely to count for much in the complex 
peacetime process by which military and national strategy are 
devised. At present the efforts of the military profession 
1n helping determine Australia's military strategy appear 
uncoordinated between the services and far less influential 
than the efforts of their civilian counterparts within the 
defence bureaucracy. 
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Diagram 5: THE CONTENT AND RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY STRATEGY 
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2. ibid, p.111. 
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advanced countries. See for example C. Leys, 
'Underdevelopment and Dependency', Journal of 
Contemporary Asia (Vol.7,No.l. 1977), pp.92-107. The 
interdependence school asserts that social and economic 
linkages exist between nations and that these linkages 
are complex and often more important than one country's 
military power in relation to another's. This school 
concentrates mainly on relations between developed 
countries. See for example. Roberto. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World 
Politics in Transition (Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 
1977). 
5. Wylie (Chapter 1, note 40), p. 86. 
6. Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy 
(Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
1965), p. 254. 
7. ibid. 
8. Michael Howard, 'The Relevance of Traditional 
Strategy', in The Causes of Wars and Other Essays 
(Unwin Paperbacks, London, Sydney, Boston, 1984), p.85. 
9. This definition differs from the definition 1n 
JSP (AS) lOl(A) (Chapter 1, note 14), which fails to 
give any importance to the preparation of the armed 
forces. (Refer Appendix 1). 
10. Captain E.F. Calthrop, R.F.A., (trans),The Book of War. 
The Military Classic of the Far East (John Murray, 
London, 1908), p. 24. 
11. Australia's 'threat environment' refers to the range of 
threats that Australia faces now or in the foreseeable 
future. According to the Strat Basis paper (1982) 
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12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
l 7. 
18. 
19. 
Australia does not face any likely military threats in 
the immediate future and considers Indonesia only as a 
potential long term military threat. The Strat Basis, 
however, has identified a number of possible low level 
threats that could arise at short notice and which 
would require an Australian military response. See The 
National Times (Chapter 1, note 30). 
The 'Operating Environment' refers to the physical 
nature of the environment in which Australian forces 
are most likely to operate. This includes the 
Australian mainland, its offshore islands and 
territories, the exclusive economic zone, and the air 
and maritime approaches to these. The operating 
environment involves an analysis of such things as 
climate, terrain, vegetation, sea states, tides, etc. 
In the Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare (MLW), 
One.1.1, The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations 
(draft, 3 November 1984), the operational level of war 
is explained as being 'concerned with the planning and 
conduct of campaigns', normally at the 'army' or 
'corps' level. 
FM 100-5 (Chapter 1, note 14), p.2.3. 
For a fuller discussion on this, and its importance to 
Australia, see Millar (Chapter 1, note 27), pp. 289-
290. Millar explains that Australia is inexperienced 
in this matter, and that Blarney's appointment as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces in 
1942 does not provide a good example for the future. 
Within the Department of Defence FDA and SIP Divisions 
have the greatest influence in the determination and 
justification of force structures and strategic employ-
ment concepts. These Divisions are civilian managed 
and predominantly civilian staffed. 
No clear position has been reached by the three 
services as to the extent of the contribution each 
service should make to national security. For example 
the RAN's uncertainty about the exact role it should 
play in the maritime defence of Australian interests 
has hightened since the loss (and non replacement) of 
HMAS Melbourne. The RAN has recently seconded a naval 
officer (Commander) to the Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, ANO, to study this problem. 
This was evidenced by the various positions of the 
services during the carrier debate (refer Chapter 2, 
note 45.) Considerable work has been accomplished, 
however, in improving the command and control 
procedures largely as a result of experience gained in 
the KANGAROO series of exercises. 
The notion 
dimensions 
8), 'The 
that military strategy may have 
was derived from Howard (Chapter 
Forgotten Dimensions of Military 
certain 
2, note 
Strategy,' 
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pp. 101-115. 
20. Wylie (Chapter 1, note 40) points out (p. 79, fn) that 
Clausewitz never actually made this statement. 
However, there can be no doubt that this phrase 
quoted so often - is an accurate distillation of 
Clausewitz's belief in the need for the supremacy of 
political thought over military action. 
21. Millar (Chapter 1, note 27), p. 283. 
22. E. G. Keogh, South West Pacific 1941-45 (Grayflower, 
Melbourne, 1965), p. 428. 
23. 'Political awareness' is not meant in the party 
political sense, but in the broader sense of awareness 
of the principles and foundations of democratic 
government. In itself this means participation and 
not isolation. 
24. Robert Jervis has written extensively about 
'perceptions.' See for example 'Deterrence and 
Perception,' International Security (Vol 7, no. 3, 
winter 1982/83). 
2 5. The appointment 
conduct a review 
ADF, and the 
strategy in the 
are examples of 
Chapter 3. 
in 1984 of Major General Butler to 
of senior officer development for the 
increased attention being given to 
military academies and staff colleges 
this. These points are elaborated in 
26. This is evidenced by such things as: the operational 
settings for the KANGAROO series of exercises for which 
allied commitment has been important but not 
essential; the increased importance being placed on 
the operational level of war, particularly by Army; 
increased attention being given to the conduct and 
support of operations in the Australian operating 
environment, free from allied support; and the 
increased incidence of joint force exercises and 
training. 
27. In general, many civilian bureaucrats have little 
understanding of military organisations: of how and 
why these organisations need to be structured in 
certain ways, and why the conduct of military 
operations is such a complex business. 
Understandably, they are inexperienced in the business 
of war. This would not be so bad if it was not for 
the fact that these same bureaucrats have so much 
influence in force structure development. It is not 
uncommon for the military to waste considerable time 
(and taxpayers' money) in justifying quite routine 
proposals. (A recent example was when Army was told 
to justify why it needed machine guns.) Of course, 
this is not to suggest that military capability 
proposals should not be vetted, of course they must. 
But it does nothing for civil-military relations 
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28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
3 2. 
33. 
34. 
within the Department when the military feel (and 
sometimes justifiably) that their civilian counterparts 
- who hold most of the aces in the decision-making 
process - are actually quite ignorant about many 
matters on which they deliberate. (Equally, it has 
been noted elsewhere in this sub-thesis that the 
supremacy the civilian bureaucrats have over the 
military is due partly to the military's poor 
understanding of strategy and to continued inter-
service rivalry, particularly in budgetry matters.) 
Research of public Department of Defence documents 
reveals that the term 'self-reliance' was first used in 
the Defence Report 1972 (p.4). However, similar 
expressions are contained in Defence Report 1970 (p.4) 
and Defence Report 1971 (p.3). It would appear that 
the need for greater self-reliance was spurred by the 
Nixon (Guam) Doctrine of 1969 (refer chapter 3, note 
22). However, until the Whitlam Labor Government was 
elected in late 1972 the need for greater self-reliance 
remained linked to the maintenance of a forward defence 
policy. This is enunciated clearly in the Defence 
Review 1972 (pp.2,27). The linking of self-reliance 
to continental defence (ie not forward defence) 
occurred during the Whitlam Labor Government (1972-75) 
and was largely accepted by and explained in the Fraser 
Conservative Government's Defence White Paper, 1976 
(pp.10-11). 
Considerable work of a conceptual nature has been 
completed by the Defence Department and the ADF in 
relation to self-reliance, but little of this effort 
has been translated into actual military capabilities. 
It is arguable that, in terms of operational 
capability, the ADF was probably more self-reliant when 
it was involved in an alliance strategy of forward 
defence than it is today. 
Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, A History 
of Warfare (Collins, London, 1968), p. 383. 
Field Marshal Lord Wavell, cited in Australian Army 
Manual of Land Warfare (MLW) One. 1.6, Administration 
in the Area of Operations (November, 1977). p.1:1. 
For example, Army runs a Logistics Exercise (LOGEX) 
every year or two which examines national logistic 
problems as well as operational support problems. And 
on Army tactics courses and at Command and Staff 
College more emphasis than hitherto is given to 
logistics/administration problems. 
Eccles (Chapter 2, note 6), p.67. 
Cited in Michael Howard, 'Jomini and the Classical 
Tradition in Military Thought' in Studies in War and 
Peace (Temple Smith, London, 1970), p.32. 
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3 5. JSP(AS) lOl(A) (Chapter 1, note 14), 
defined as: 
administration 1s 
'a. The management and execution of all military 
matters not included in tactics and 
strategy; primarily in the field of logistics and 
personnel management. 
b. Internal management of units.' 
It is the belief of this author that administration and 
logistics are part of strategy (or strategic thinking) 
and that it is not possible to separate them from 
strategy. 
36. Some eminent strategists contended that nuclear weapons 
actually rendered large scale conventional forces 
obsolete. See for example Brodie (Chapter 1, note 7), 
p. 412. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
A common claim in relation to these modern conventional 
weapons is that 'if a target can be acquired it will be 
hit, and if hit it will be destroyed.' 
Asymmetric conflicts are those between unequal powers, 
for example as between the United States and North 
Vietnam. Technology has assisted the smaller power as 
well as the larger. In the case of Vietnam, 
technology (and financial assistance) helped North 
Vietnam to be equipped with modern, light, reliable and 
accurate weapons systems; as well, the United States 
was able to use highly advanced weaponry and 
intelligence gathering devices. 
Howard (Chapter 2, note 19), p. 114. Howard noted 
that: 'we appear to be depending on the technological 
dimension of strategy to the detriment of its 
operational requirements, while we ignore its 
societal implications altogether.' 
Beaufre (chapter 1, note 1), p. 49. 
J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History (Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, London, 1946), pp.x,21-22; and Machine 
Warfare (Hutchinson, London, New York, Melbourne, 
1942), pp.75-84 
Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier 
Military Strategy in Transition: Defence 
Deterrence in the 1980s (US Army War College, 
Barracks, c. 1983), p. 7. 
(eds), 
and 
Carlisle 
43. The overall resource management of the defence forces 
(ie. manpower, money and materiel) is enshrined in the 
Five Year Defence Programme (FYDP). The FYDP is 
divided into five programing categories - manpower 
Defence Cooperation Program (DCP), operating costs, 
capital facilities, and capital equipment. It is in 
the areas of non-approved facilities and equipment 
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44. 
45. 
proposals that most bargaining occurs. However, even 
approved projects included in the FYDP are sometimes 
deferred or cancelled (and sometimes others are 
inserted) as the FYDP is reviewed annually. For 
example, the fourth FFG for the RAN was never part of 
the FYDP estimates. For an unclassified and 
simplified explanation of the FYDP refer 'Background 
Brief: The Five Year Defence Program' (Directorate 
General of Training and Education Policy, January 1984, 
unclassified). 
The initial decision to acquire a replacement carrier 
was agreed in the DFDC on a split vote: the CDFS 
(Synnot), CNS (Willis) and CGS (Dunstan) were in 
favour, and only the Secretary (Pritchett) and the CAS 
(McNamara) were opposed. By November 1982 the 
situation had changed with the Secretary, CDFS (now 
McNamara) and CAS (Evans) all opposed, the CGS 
(Bennett) uncommitted, and the CNS (Leach) the only one 
in favour. Refer: Gary Brown, Prospects and 
Problems for Australian Higher Defence Organisation 
After the Report of the Defence Review Committee 
(Parliament of Commonwealth of Australia, Legislative 
Research Service, Discussion Paper No. 3, 1983), p. 80. 
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and satellite 
intelligence (SATINT) are the most obvious areas in 
which advances have been made. However, technological 
developments also have enhanced intelligence gathering 
capabilities within the area/theatre of operations. 
These advances include: high resolution photo 
reconnaissance, remotely piloted vehicles and remote 
sensors. 
46. This is a personal opinion derived from involvement 1n 
and awareness of, a number of military exercises in 
Australia over the past 15 years. In most of these 
exercises commanders have paid lip service to the 
importance of intelligence. Exercise KANGAROO 81 was 
probably the first real attempt by military staffs to 
practise the intelligence function seriously at all 
levels of command. (The author is unaware of the 
importance given to intelligence in most RAN and RAAF 
exercises.) 
47. In addition to existing capabilities, examples of this 
importance include: the development of JINDALEE, over-
the-horizon (OTH-B) radar; and the possible future 
acquisition of battlefield surveillance equipment by 
Army. 
48. The closest Australia has to a civil defence 
organisation is the Natural Disasters Organisation 
(NDO) which is an 'outrider' organisation of the 
Department of Defence. However, the NDO is currently 
concerned with natural disasters - cyclones, floods, 
fires etc - and is not organised, trained or equipped 
for civil defence tasks which normally include 
protective security and local defence. According to 
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49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
Desmond Ball, 'in Australia, the prevailing attitude 
[to civil defence] can fairly be described as one of 
apathy.' Refer: 'Attitudes and Developments in Civil 
Defence Around the World,' in Desmond Ball (ed) 
(Chapter 1, note 3), p. 140. 
Three levels of conflict applicable to Australia (low 
medium and high) are described in Australian Joint 
Operations Doctrine, JSP (AS) l (A). For an 
unclassified and comprehensive description of these 
levels of conflict see Brigadier J.N. Stein, 'The 
Administrative Support Concepts for Land Operations in 
Defence of Australia,' Presentation to the Conference 
on The Civil Infrastructure in the Defence of 
Australia: Asset and Vulnerabilities (ANU, Canberra, 
28 November - 2 December 1983), P.8. More recently, 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and Defence categorised possible threats into 'low, 
intermediate, invasion, and global conflict.' See, The 
Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and 
Capabilities (Cross Report) (October 1984), chapter 1, 
paras 1.49 - 1.72. 
The reason for this is that 'warning time' for higher 
level conflict is likely to be insufficient for the 
'defence preparation time' required to militarily deter 
or combat the emerging threat. For a discussion of 
warning time and defence preparation time see note 61 
of this chapter. 
In the Australian Army the Intelligence Corps 
technically is one of the fighting 'arms', rather than 
a 'service'. However, the more traditional fighting 
arms from which senior commanders invariably have come 
are Infantry, Artillery, Armour and Engineers. 
For example: Britain in Malaya/Malaysia France in Indo-
china and Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. 
For a succinct description of various examples of total 
defence, including Sweden and Switzerland, refer David 
Martin, Armed Neutrality For Australia (Drummond, 
Victoria, 1984), chapters 6-8. 
ibid, chapters 1,5. 
Australia's present military strategy rests on the 
maintenance of an outline force structure (the 'core 
force' concept) which can be fleshed out and expanded 
as the need arises. This strategy is intended to 
defend against low level threats and deter higher level 
threats. The anomaly with this strategy is that for 
deterrence to be credible, military capabilities must 
be seen by a prospective enemy as being available (or 
potentially available) within a time period that will 
affect military operations. This is the basis of 
nuclear deterrence, as well as conventional deterrence; 
but it is a fundamental fact that Australian defence 
67 ........ 
!I 
L 
r! 
policy-makers appear reluctant to acknowledge. 
56. This fact was highlighted during the 'carrier debate'. 
(Refer Chapter 2, note 44.) 
5 7. 
5 8. 
5 9. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
J.S. Baker, 'The Requirements of National Strategy', 
Defence Force Journal (No. 10, May/June 1978), p.10. 
The author has been unable to find evidence to suggest 
that the military has actively sought (or seeks) to 
promote its views on the future direction of 
Australia's defence. More often than not it 
awaits ministerial decisions and modifies its peacetime 
operational policies in light of changing budgetry 
circumstances. The hurried decision to expand the 
Army Reserve as a result of Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in 1979 is an illustration of the reactive 
nature of military strategic thought. See also chapter 
4, note 6. 
For a description of some of these committees see 
Jolika Tie, J. O. Langtry and Robert O'Neill, 
Australia's Defence Resources (ANU, Canberra, 1978), 
pp. 62-74. Some of the committees listed have been re-
named, but the fact remains that decision-making rests 
on a committee-system. 
Refer Chapter 1, notes 31-32; and Chapter 2, note 16. 
The Australian Army has defined these terms as follows: 
Warning Time is 'that time which elapses from when an 
aggressor first conducts activities which are either 
hostile or which may lead to hostility in the future, 
to the moment when hostilities actually commence.' 
Defence Preparation Time is 'the time available to the 
Defence Force during which preparations, above normal 
levels, may occur. This time will commence when the 
Government first acknowledges the threat and directs 
defence preparation to commence.' Refer: Army 
Development Guide (Provisional), Volume 1, Terminology 
Section (note: these terms are unclassified). 
Several studies have indicated that defence preparation 
time is likely to be inadequate to meet emerging 
threats within the warning time available. See for 
example: I.M. Speedy, 'The Trident of Neptune', 
Defence Force Journal (No. 8, January/February, 1978), 
pp. 7-15; and J.O. Langtry and Desmond J. Ball, 
Controlling Australia's Threat Environment. A 
Methodology for Planning Australian Defence Force 
Development (ANU, Canberra, 1979), pp. 4-5. 
operations are those conducted 
one service. Joint operations are 
Single-service 
predominently by 
those involving 
operations are those 
or more countries. 
two or more services. Combined 
involving military forces from two 
The profession has an 
Establishment (AJWE),and 
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and Plans (JMOP) organisation within the Department of 
Defence. However, in general each of the services 
places more attention on its own training 
establishments and organisations. For example, within 
Army less emphasis has been given by the Military 
Secretary to the importance of officers working in a 
tri-service environment than to them holding key 
command and staff appointments within Army. 
64. For a useful summary of why the military profession 
and the 'military mind' is conservative see Huntington 
(Chapter 1, note 22), p. 79. 
6 5. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
66. ibid. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC THINKING IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY PROFESSION 
It is universally agreed upon, that no 
art or science is more difficult, than 
that of war; yet by an unaccountable 
contradiction of the human mind, those 
who embrace this profession take little 
or no pains to study it.(l) 
Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd, 1766 
Generally throughout the world military education( 2 ) has 
advanced and improved . since Henry Lloyd's accurate, if 
uncharitable, observations of 1766. In Australian society 
today the military represents an established and highly 
structured profession in which military education plays an 
important role. Officers are no longer born but made. Most 
are commissioned only after completing an intensive induction 
period which lasts from one to four years, ( 3 ) and their 
subsequent promotion depends largely on attendance and 
performance at various courses in addition to 'on-the-job' 
performance. It would seem that military education has 
become, and continues to become, more formalised and 
comprehensive than even Henry Lloyd would have imagined. The 
actual and potential horrors of war, spawned both by 
technological innovation and by the evolution of mankind into 
a volatile society of more or less independent states, has 
demanded that military establishments become more 
professional as 'managers [or potential managers] of 
violence•.( 4 ) 
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However - and as Michael Howard has explained - when 
Henry Lloyd spoke of the military's reluctance to study war 
he was not thinking only of the need to understand its 
'mechanics' but also its 'application', the latter which 
included an understanding of the human element of warfare 
that could not be learnt from memorising simple principles or 
maxims.(5) In fact, Lloyd was challenging the military (and 
others) to think strategically: to consider why military 
force might be necessary; when and how the military might be 
used most appropriately; and how the military should best 
prepare itself. 
Chapter 1 explained why strategic thinking is important 
to the military profession. It showed that the execution 
('mechanics') of military force in the field of tactics has 
received more attention by the profession than has the 
formulation ('application') of sound national and military 
strategy. Chapter 2 demonstrated the complex nature of 
military strategy and its relationship with national 
strategy. It highlighted the point that the Australian 
military profession generally has given inadequate attention 
to strategic thinking. This chapter examines the reasons for 
this situation and explains the current state of military 
education in strategic matters. Two related questions are 
addressed: 
• Why has the Australian military profession 
hitherto given so little attention to the 
development of strategic thinking? 
71 
....... 
r 
I•! 
• And what military education in strategic matters 
is currently undertaken by the Australian 
military profession? 
Limitations to Development 
Four reasons help explain why the Australian military 
profession has given little attention to strategic matters. 
The first, and by far the most important, concerns Australian 
history, or at least the development of the Australian 
military profession as part of Australia's history. 
Although defence issues provided an important catalyst 
for Federation, and despite (or because of) Australia's 
involvement in a number of wars overseas, efforts to devise 
an independent defence strategy for Australia have been 
sporadic. Not until the threat of Japanese invasion in World 
War 2 was Australia required to consider seriously how it 
would handle its own security.(6)until that time Australia 
had relied on Britain and the notion of imperial defence, the 
credibility of which, after World War 1, depended upon the 
survival of the Singapore Base and sufficient Empire forces 
being made available for the Far East in the event of war.( 7 ) 
The Japanese thrust into the Pacific and into south-east Asia 
from December 1941 showed the inadequacy of empire defence. 
However, with the eventual defeat of Japan by the Allies in 
1945 the urgency for national defence again waned . 1n 
Australia. Demobilisation, resettlement, and post-war 
reconstruction became the most important national issues, and 
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the development of an independent defence strategy to deter 
or combat future possible aggression again received modest 
attention.(8) However, partly bacause of international 
uncertainties,(9)the Labor government approved in June 1947 
the formation of the Permanent Military Forces (PMF) (19,000 
strong) to be backed by the larger Citizen Military Forces 
(CMF) (50,000).(lO)The primary roles of these forces were 
their potential contribution to United Nations commitments 
and/or to British Commonwealth defence, as well as the 
provision of an expansion base in the event of war.(11) The 
'local defence of the the Australian mainland 1 (12)was seen as 
a less likely role than that of operating abroad with 
allies. 
In the immediate post-war era each of the . services was 
seen by government, and saw themselves, mainly as separate 
identities, each concerned in some way with national defence, 
but administered, organised and equipped to perform different 
functions and . . requ1r1ng only loose liaison and 
cooperation.(13) The government and the services appreciated 
the need to develop and maintain military capabilities for 
sea, air and land warfare, but the necessity for developing 
coherent joint operations, so clearly demonstrated in World 
War 2, seemed to escape government and its defence advisers. 
With little thought of acquiring defence self-reliance the 
government looked both to Britain and the U.S. to help secure 
Australia's sovereignty and accordingly, in the intended 
protection of Australia's security, contributed forces to aid 
their allies.(14)The actual roles and future organisations of 
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the services remained uncertain, indeed as they were 1n 
Britain and the U.S., where the utility of conventional 
forces was still being assessed with the dawn of the nuclear 
age. Unable to do much else the RAN continued to sail its 
ships in the classic blue-water tradition of the British 
Navy, now extolling the virtues of aircraft carriers, 
maritime air, submarines and anti-submarine warfare, but 
assuming always that Australian sea and air power would be 
projected within the region as part of a larger allied force. 
Relatively little thought was given to Australian joint 
operations or to the development of a distinctive Australian 
military strategy. The Army concentrated its efforts in the 
area of minor tactics, capitalising on its World War 2 
experience in jungle warfare and developing counter-
insurgency skills of a high order. The Army stayed abreast of 
developments in conventional limited warfare and 
technological advances. The virtues of mechanised, 
parachuting and amphibious operations had all been learnt in 
World War 2, as had the increasing importance of aerial fire 
support, but generally the Army remained uncertain as to how 
these capabilities could be incorporated into any military 
strategy without allied support. Moreover, and despite the 
importance of these military capabilities, the types of 
conflict in which Australian forces became involved did not 
require the Australian forces to develop an independent 
military strategy. The RAAF, the junior and poor cousin of 
the services between the wars,(15) used the lessons of World 
War 2 to demonstrate the importance of air power for the 
future.(16) Within RAAF emphasis was given to the 
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development of strategic bombing (later called strategic 
strike), to long range reconnaissance, air interdiction and 
long range transportation.(17) Each of the services had 
specific requirements and priorities for aviation and this 
led to the establishment of the RAN Fleet Air Arm in 1947 and 
the first Army Light Aircraft Squadron in 1960.(lB) 
The disparate state of the three services can be seen as 
a direct reflection of Australia's national strategy in the 
post-war era. This strategy called for the continued reliance 
on more powerful allies for defence, and the willingness if 
necessary to assist these allies in the fight against 
communism as far from Australia's shores as practicable. More 
than anything else the emergence of Communist China in 1949, 
and the apparent closeness in relations between Moscow and 
Peking,(19) heightened the tensions of the Cold War and 
brought to Australia fear of a spreading monolithic communist 
regime. Throughout the 1950s - 1960s events in Korea, the 
Philippines, Malaya/Malaysia, Indonesia and Indo-China tended 
in Australia to be interpreted (at least publicly) in this 
simplistic fashion, and the Austalian services were 
organised primarily to contribute to allied commitments. 
Close military ties were maintained with Britain,(20) but 
because of Britain's diminishing power in the Far East, 
Australia (and New Zealand) gravitated more and more toward 
the USA, now the undisputed dominant power in the Pacific. 
Even before the ANZUS Security Pact was signed in September 
1951, an Australia - US alliance had begun to be formed from 
the two nations common experience during the war in the 
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Pacific, more recently in Korea in 1950, and also because of 
both countries close alliance with Britain. 
The British withdrawal east of Suez (1967 - 71),(2l)the 
Nixon (Guam) Doctrine (1969),(22) and the political defeat 
and withdrawal of US and allied forces from South Vietnam 
(1972),(23) all contributed to a reassessment of Australia's 
national strategy. Thus, from the early 1970s the notion of 
forward defence was replaced by one of continental 
defence(24) and this new national strategy rested on two 
conditions, namely maintenance of the ANZUS alliance and 
enhanced self-reliance.(25) 
This perceived need for enhanced defence self-reliance, 
more than anything else, provided both the cause and the 
impetus for . senior military officers, civilian defence 
analysts and academics to reconsider Australia's future 
strategy. What military (and non-military) options were 
realistically open to Australia? What could the nation 
provide and willingly afford in peacetime to become more 
self-reliant? What force structure was the most appropriate 
to ensure Australia's sovereignty and, simultaneously, to 
help maintain peace within Australia's prime . region of 
interest? What impact was technology having on equipment 
acquisition and future force structure? What conflicts seemed 
most likely, and ' in what circumstances might the ANZUS 
alliance be found wanting? How relevant were the force 
structures of the three services? And how viable were the 
operating procedures and the command and control facilities 
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within the ADF? These were the sorts of problems that 
increased self-reliance inflicted upon Australia's defence 
planners. 
It is important that this historical development 1n 
Australia's strategic thinking be appreciated fully. 
Australia is a young country whose national and military 
strategies are still in their formative stages. Australia 
resides in a relatively peaceful part of the globe; it is 
able to identify only a remote chance of a regional military 
threat to its security; (26) it has not had to fight for its 
freedom or its independence from an imperial power; and by 
and large it has never been troubled by the sort of divisive 
internal problems so rampant in many parts of the world.( 2 7) 
Tied to Britain for so long, and then by necessity to the US 
in World War 2, it is understandable that the Australian 
military profession should concentrate its attention on the 
techniques of war (for which it gained and international 
reputation of high standing), rather than developing 
expertise in the less precise area of strategic thinking. 
The second reason why the Australian military profession 
has given scant attention to strategic thinking is related to 
this historical issue. This reason is simply that until the 
late 1960s - early 1970s - at least within a few years of 
the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in January 1968(28)- the 
Australian military profession had not been required to be 
experienced in matters of strategy. Australian military 
forces traditionally had operated as part of larger allied 
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contingents and for the most part had been supported 
logistically by, and subordinatied to, their larger allies. 
As a result the profession had gained little experience in 
the preparation, planning and conduct of military operations 
that could be mounted and sustained independently from 
allies. Probably the closest Australia had come to this was 
from about June 1941 when the Chiefs of Staff (already 
• 
preoccupied with Australian military involvement in the 
Mediterranean littoral and in Singapore-Malaya) began to give 
serious consideration to the defence of Australia.( 29 ) 
However, by the time the American, General Douglas MacArthur, 
had been appointed Commander-in-Chief South-West Pacific Area 
in March 1942, Australian military strategy had already begun 
to revert 
allies. (30) 
to its traditional reliance on more powerful 
Only . since withdrawal from Vietnam has the Australian 
military profession considered seriously how military 
operations might have to be conducted within the Australian 
environment free from major allied support. With this has 
come the need for the profession to be able to produce its 
own theatre and area commanders and for these commanders to 
have a thorough understanding of joint force operations and 
the logistics required to make them work. But mostly the 
profession has been required to raise its sights: to give 
some thought as to how force structures should be developed 
to meet these challenges. The military can no longer be 
concerned merely with acquiring and utilising military 
capabilities, it must now justify the capabilities it 
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requires and the purposes for which they are intended. There 
are those in the ADF who lament this situation and see this 
requirement as an unnecessary obstacle to the more 
exhilarating job of training for war, but there can be little 
argument that if military strategy is to have credibility 
then this work needs to be done by the military profession 
with the same level of expertise that training requires. 
The third reason why the Australian military profession 
has given little attention to strategic thinking relates to 
the military's perception of its role in society, or what 1s 
more commonly called the civil-military interface. Since the 
late 1950s - early 1960s military sociologists generally have 
belonged to one of two schools concerning the way the 
military profession should be structured to operate. The 
first school gained prominence as a result of Samuel P. 
Huntington's influential text, The Soldier and the State 
(1957).(31) The Huntington model proposed a politically 
neutral profession, isolated from society and concerned with 
the achievement of military victory without regard to non-
military considerations. The model saw the military as a 
state-within-a-state: a profession mainly pursued separately 
from major societal influence, apolitical in nature, but 
totally obedient to the elected government of the day. In the 
Huntington model professional expertise is best achieved 
because high standards can be set and attained free from 
external (non-military) interference. 
The second school developed largely from Morris 
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Janowitz's The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political 
Portrait (1960).(32) This school saw the role of the 
military in society quite differently. The Janowitz model 
proposed a politically sensitive profession integrated with 
society and concerned with the threat or use of force in the 
interests of society. This model saw the military more as a 
constabulary force for which the more traditional values of 
war fighting (33) were supplanted in importance by the need 
for the military to threaten or use force to achieve limited 
political objectives. In a sense the Janowitz model 
recognised that in the nuclear age wars of attrition, or 
military operations designed to secure territorial 
objectives, had less relevance.(34) What was required was a 
military profession in tune with the interests of its own 
society, capable when necessary of exerting military muscle 
in specific situations, most often for limited political 
purposes than for absolute military victory. Thus, in this 
model the military assumed the mantle of a constabulary 
force, in the same way that police forces partially deter 
crime and partially control it by limiting the prospects for 
its escalation. In the Janowitz model (as with Huntington's) 
the military was controlled by, and remained loyal to, the 
elected government; but as part of society it could 
contribute much more to the decision-making process and was 
less passive than the Huntington counterpart. 
In Australia the role of the military . 1n society has 
traditionally reflected Huntington's model although 
incremental change towards the Janowitz model has occurred in 
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recent years.(35) Separated professionally from society and 
remaining loyal to the government, the Australian military 
has had little incentive to foster expertise in complex 
matters of strategy. The military of course has given advice 
to government when requested, but overall the profession has 
remained passive in the formulation of strategy and has 
addressed most of its attention to the implementation of 
decisions in a reactive manner. The profession has 
concentrated its efforts in developing expertise in the 
techniques of warfare rather than in helping determine the 
most appropriate national and military strategy to be 
adopted. The feeling within the military traditionally has 
been that they should be told what to do, and then be allowed 
to get on and do it; and it is in this latter area that 
professional expertise has been concentrated. 
The final reason which helps explain the profession's 
lack of attention to strategic thinking concerns the emphasis 
given it in formal military education. It is this question 
which the remainder of this chapter addresses. 
Military Education and Strategic Thinking 
Strategy is by nature a dynamic subject for study: on 
the one hand it suggests certain time-tested maxims 
fundamental to most military actions, (36) but on the other 
it must cope with technological innovations and social 
predilections that are in a state of constant change or flux. 
Chapter 1 indicated that strategic thinking covers a vast 
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domain which requires military action to be seen in the 
shadow of national strategy and not in isolation. Military 
capabilities are required to satisfy political ends, not to 
be used for their own sake or without due regard to the 
consequences of their use, or non use. Chapter 2 explained 
further that even the understanding of one area of strategic 
thinking - namely military strategy - is difficult because it 
defies simple categorisation. Together these chapters suggest 
that strategic thinking is a continual process that remains 
relevant to military professionals throughout their career. 
It would be unreasonable, therefore, to expect to find in the 
military curricula a single course that could imbue the 
profession with an appreciation of strategy. Rather, we must 
look at the officers' career in a more general way. 
What education in strategic matters is conducted 
formally by the Australian military profession?(37) One way 
of examining this question is to look at the various stages 
of the officers' career and determine the nature of the 
formal education they receive in the field of strategy. Table 
1 summarises this by dividing the officer's career into three 
stages - 'early', 'middle' and 'late' - and lists against 
each stage the typical officer rank and the formal education 
available which involves strategy .(38) A synopsis of the 
strategy component of the courses formally conducted is 
contained in Appendix 3. 
In general it can be said that the study of strategy 
currently does not play an important part in officer 
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development, although there are signs that strategy . lS 
becoming increasingly important. Under the current system of 
single service training, officers receive little or no 
instruction in strategy until reaching the middle stage of 
their career, and then only if they are selected to attend 
Table 1: Formal ADF Education in Strategic Matters 
CAREER STAGE 
Early 
Middle 
Late 
APPROX RANK 
(Army equivalent) 
Cadet to 
Captain 
Major to 
Lieutenant-
Colonel 
Colonel 
and above 
FORMAL EDUCATION 
* Australian Defence 
Force Academy (ADFA) 
* Single Service 
Academies 
* Single Service 
Staff Colleges 
* Joint Service Staff 
College (JSSC) 
Overseas War Colleges 
and National Defence 
Colleges 
* Strategic and 
Operational Study 
Period (SOSP)-(39) 
Army only. 
* synopsis shown in Appendix 3. 
their service staff college and/or JSSc.(40) By the time 
officers reach the late stage of their career they are 
expected to have developed a sound grasp of Australia's . 
strategic circumstances, 
after JSSC are few,(41) 
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SOSP, are conducted overseas and do not address themselves 
specifically to the Australian environment.(42) Moreover, 
military education in strategy currently is not well 
coordinated either within or between the services. For 
example, within Army it is possible for some cadets doing 
Arts in the Faculty of Military Studies, Duntroon, to 
concentrate on subjects of strategic significance (through 
the History and/or Government Departments) and then to 
further these studies at the Army Command and Staff College 
(C&SC), JSSC and (in some circumstances) by post graduate 
work; whereas the majority of Army officers are unlikely to 
be exposed formally to these subjects until at least C&SC, 
and then only briefly. Perhaps of greater concern, however, 
is the fact that little effort is currently made to 
coordinate instruction in strategic studies between the 
services until JSSC, (43) by which time officers are likely 
already to have served in the defence bureaucracy or in a 
tri-service environment where an understanding of strategy 
would have proved beneficial.(44) 
However, just as strategic thinking is itself subject to 
change, so too are the institutions in which officers are 
educated.(45) It needs to be stressed that there are positive 
signs that the importance of strategy is being recognised and 
that measures are being taken to enhance the profession's 
understanding of strategy. These changes are evident at each 
of the three career stages. Overall there is a trend to 
commence officer education in strategy much sooner, to 
continue it throughout the officers' career, and for each 
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service to become more familiar with the others' concerns 
about strategy. 
Probably the most significant change is intended to 
occur with the commencement of ADFA in 1986. ADFA will be the 
source of about 40 percent of the officer establishment of 
the Defence Force.(46) In the History and Politics 
Departments at ADFA those topics related to strategy 
presently offered to Arts students in the Faculty of 
Military Studies, Duntroon, will be made available, with the 
possibility that these courses might be expanded in the 
future (refer Appendix 3.1).(47) However, because these 
subjects will not be available for (or chosen by) the 
majority of students,(48) a course in Defence Studies is 
planned and is to be completed by all cadets during the first 
three years as part of the Common Military Training 
Curriculum (refer Appendix 3.2). The intended introduction of 
Defence Studies at ADFA, and the high number of periods 
allocated to it (at 162 the next highest after Officer 
Development on 165), represents an imaginative attempt by the 
military to begin the education of officers in strategic 
thinking as early as possible. Although some may question the 
suitability of some of the topics presently listed in the 
planned Defence Studies syllabus, it seems clear that the 
military profession has recognised the need for off ice rs to 
become familiar with strategy sooner rather than later 1n 
their career. This in itself is a significant departure from 
current practice. 
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There are signs also that the ADFA approach to military 
strategy is having repercussions on the single service 
academies. To date these institutions have given scant 
attention to promoting strategic thinking (refer Appendix 
3.3), but it is noteworthy that Army, forced to revise its 
officer course because of the establishment of ADFA, has made 
tentative provision for a compulsory course in Strategic 
Studies (refer Appendix 3.4). Because of the importance of 
strategy, and in order to maintain commonality in training 
and equ~lity of opportunity for non-ADFA officers, it is 
possible that RAN and RAAF may decide also to steer a similar 
course to Army on this matter. 
In recent years more emphasis than hitherto in strategic 
thinking has occurred also in the middle career stage for 
officers. Each of the single service staff colleges has come 
to devote part of its studies to strategy (refer Appendi~es 
3.5, 3.6, 3.7), and the creation of JSSC largely reflected 
the perceived need of the services for selected officers to 
be educated in matters such as military strategy, 
international politics, national infrastructure, and the 
formulation of defence policy (refer Appenix 3.8). Indeed, 
the education of the Australian military profession in 
strategic matters should be seen as an evolving process, and 
criticism of the present situation should acknowledge this. 
The JSSC (initially named the Joint Service Wing) was not 
established until 1969 and the RAN Staff College did not run 
its first course until 1979. The Army can claim a longer 
historical 1 ineage, its first course being conducted in 1946 
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as the successor to the Command and Staff School founded in 
Sydney in 1938.(49) However, this course was for many years 
an operational staff course designed to prepare Majors for 
operational staff appointments, and was changed to include 
more strategy following the recommendations of the 
RODC Report in 1978.(50) The RAAF Staff College was formed 
in 1949, but as with Army, has broadened its scope to 
concentrate on strategic studies only in recent years.(Sl) 
Recent developments have occurred also in the late 
career stage for officers in relation to strategic thinking. 
In June 1983 Army conducted its first SOSP. In 1984 the aim 
ofSOSPwas 
••• to excercise and update the knowledge of 
senior officers in the areas of strategy, high 
level of operations and admir~~rration as applied 
to the defence of Australia. 
However, an additional . aim, as explained by the CGS in his 
Keynote Address in 1983, was to encourage the future self-
development of, and study in, strategic matters of those 
senior officers attending.(53) About 20 off ice rs of colonel 
rank and above currently attend the SOSP which lasts for 
about 3-4 days. However, officers attending are expected to 
have completed prescribed reading beforehand, thus enabling 
them to contribute purposefully during the discussions. The 
SOSP is not intended to be a fixed syllabus, and may change 
its emphasis from year to year, depending on current and 
forseen strategic problems, and on the interests of the CGS 
who currently is the Exercise Director. For example, the 1984 
SOSP concentrated on strategy, lower level conflict, high 
level conflict, and the operational level of war (refer 
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Appendix 3.9). The SOSP should be seen as an ambitious 
attempt by Army to assist in the continued education of its 
senior officers in matters of strategic importance. Its 
introduction, however, reflects also the concern held by Army 
that many of its senior officers presently are inadequately 
prepared in matters relating to defence policy, strategy, 
high command, and ~ateriel acquisition. 
However, of more potential significance for future 
senior officers of all services are the findings of the 
Senior Officer Development Review 1984, conducted by Major 
General D.M. Butler AO DSO (RL). The aim of the Review was to 
'identify any significant deficiencies in the preparation of 
officers for senior appointments in the Defence Forces•.(54) 
The Review looked at Colonel equivalent and above. It 
concluded that within the ADF 'there is a perception of a 
lack of tradition in strategic thinking•,(55) and 
recommended both that a 'National Defence College (NDC) 
should be established •.• to conduct a twelve month full time 
course to prepare officers for high command•,(56) and that 
'all other officers of the rank of Colonel equivalent and 
above should undergo a twelve month part time 
programme .•. •.(57) Butler's report is still under 
consideration, but its findings provide prima facie evidence 
that current senior officers have an inadequate understanding 
of national and military strategy and that remedial action is 
required. 
All these changes (actual and potential) in relation to 
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the development of strategic thinking indicate that the 
profession is aware of its own shortcomings in this field and 
that it is moving steadily, if slowly, to redress these 
problems. However, despite the positive evidence of (and for) 
change, it would seem that the education of the military 
profession in strategic matters still has far to go. It 1s 
disturbing, for example, to read Butler's comments 1n 
relation to the study of strategy at the academies, staff 
colleges and JSSC. Butler noted that: 
Training is conducted in strategy but .•. it is 
just another subject providing simple theory 
without real purpose or, in the time available, 
application. There is no depth.(58) 
Indeed, a common theme throughout Butler's report is that the 
Australian military profession has an inadequate 
understanding of strategy, and that greater effort needs to 
be ma de i n t he a re a i f t he pr o_f e s s i on i s to con t r i but e w i t h 
more purpose to national security. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has helped explain the reasons why the 
development in strategic thinking in the Australian military 
profession has occurred slowly. Historical influences, the 
military's lack of experience and tradition in strategic 
matters, and the military's isolated place in Australian 
society, are all legitimate reasons. However, inadequate 
military education also has contributed to this situation and 
it is through education that the profession's understanding 
of strategy can be, and is being, enhanced. Shelburne and 
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Contrary to popular opinion, the officer, in the 
beginning stages of his career, knows relatively 
little about the art and science of warfare, and 
it will be years before he can be accurately 
described as being truly professional in the 
sense that he can deal effectively with complex 
problems of strategy and tactics, or command and 
staff. (59) 
There are positive signs that significant development in 
strategic thinking is now occurring within the Australian 
military profession. The . swing towards the Janowitz 
constabulary model and the increased attention given to 
strategy in military institutions are proof of this. Indeed, 
much has occurred since Henry Lloyd made his observations in 
1766. However, it would seem that General Butler's findings 
are evidence to the fact that more needs to be done in the 
future, and it is with this problem that the next chapter 
wrestles. 
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sub-thesis in the broadest sense to include 
'education', 'training' and 'development'. While each 
of these terms have specific meanings they are also 
related and in the general sense can be grouped under 
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have been promoted 'through the ranks' or because they 
have been enlisted directly to fulfil certain positions 
(eg. doctors, dentists, psychologists etc.). 
4. The term 'manager of violence' gained prominence with H.D. 
Lasswell's, The Analysis of Political Behaviour (1947), p. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FUTURE 
we have not as yet ••. provided them the 
means of acquiring a theoretical and 
practical knowledge or1fhe higher duties 
of their profession. 
Emory Upton, 1878 
When Emory Upton made these comments about the American 
military profession more than a century ago he was not 
advocating that military officers should become strategic 
thinkers in the broadest sense suggested in this sub-thesis. 
Upton was concerned principally with the preparation of army 
officers for competent service on the battlefield. His 
desire that officers should be able to 'study strategy, grand 
tactics, and all the sciences connected with modern 
war•(2)has been realised by the institutional nature of 
military training that has since evolved - no less 
Australia than America or many other countries. 
. 1n 
Nevertheless, Upton's comment has equal relevance today 
if one considers the requirements of the senior military 
officer. Donald Bletz explained this well when he offered 
his profile of 'The Modern Major General' (1980). 
concluded: 
I am asking a great deal of my modern 
major general. I expect him to 
understand the society which he serves, 
to be knowledgeable of the world in 
which he lives and to have a firm grip 
on the very complex concept of the 
utility, or disutility, of military 
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force within the context of the assumed 
domestic and international environment. 
At the same time, I expect him to be a 
true expert in the conduct of military 
operations so that he has credibility in 
the deterrent role and the ability to 
"win" - to acheive the political 
objective - if force is eventually 
brought to bear.•(3) 
In essence this is what strategic thinking for the modern 
military profession is all about - a far wider vision than 
the one Upton had in mind. 
Robert O'Neill has suggested that five characteristics 
are required for the modern strategic thinker: intelligence, 
experience, intuition, knowledge of your own and the enemy's 
available resources, and a high level of morale.(4) In 
addition O'Neill contends that these characteristics need to 
be developed over time, requiring from the strategic thinker 
constant involvement in reading, thinking, writing and 
discussion.(5) O'Neill provides helpful advice for 
budding individual strategists, but it is unlikely that the 
profession's image and capability in strategic matters will 
be enhanced by following this advice alone. Like Upton, the 
profession also needs to examine the institutional 
imperatives that largely will determine the degree of 
competence and influence exercised by the military 1n 
strategic matters in the future. Three of these imperatives 
are: 
. a more active role by the military in strategic 
thinking, 
. improved inter-service relations to enhance strategic 
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thinking, and 
. better military education to improve strategic 
thinking. 
These imperatives are the underlying themes of this sub-
thesis, and they are examined further in this final chapter. 
The Role of the Military 
In Australian society the military is subordinate to the 
democratically elected government. This is the proper place 
of the military in a democracy: a place that the Australian 
military profession has filled well in the past and will 
undoubtedly d o so for the foreseeable future. However, it 
would seem that the ability of the military to think 
strategically has been constrained because the profession has 
interpreted its subordinate role in two rather negative ways. 
First, in respect to its position in society, the military 
has tended to adopt a Huntington model (refer chapter 3), 
generally keeping the profession somewhat separate from 
society by fostering standards and customs . . in a quasi-
autonomous manner. Second, . . in exposing the virtues of 
civilian control in the use of force, the military has 
allowed itself to become subordinated not so much to 
ministerial control as to the control of civilian bureaucrats 
in the Department of Defence. 
Both of these conditions are related, and both need to 
be redressed by the military if the profession is to play a 
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more positive role in the formulation of strategy as well as 
in its execution. In relation to the role of the military 1n 
society it would seem that the Australian profession should 
move more rapidly to embrace Janowitz's constabulary model 
(refer chapter 3). This would not alter the military's 
subordination to government. However, by integrating the 
military more with society, and thus making it more aware of 
and accountable to society's concerns, the profession would 
be required to assume more responsibility for its actions 
(and non-actions). As an . integral part of Australian society 
the Australian military profession would have the 
responsibility not only to enforce (when necessary) the will 
of government, but equally to proffer advice to government 
with clarity and thoughtfulness. This would mean that the 
profession would be required to think more strategically than 
hitherto: to be aware of the likely consequences of using or 
threatening military force, and not concerned solely with the 
mechanics of using force should the government so decide. It 
is noteworthy that in relation to the Vietnam War the public 
record can be searched without memorable trace of concern by 
the Australian military as to the strategic sensibility of 
becoming involved in that tragic episode. In the Huntington 
model such action might be acclaimed in terms of loyalty, or 
patriotism, or impartiality. But in today's society this 
interpretation somehow seems anachronistic, and in the 
Janowitz model might be interpreted more correctly as 
ignorance or (worse still) irresponsibility on the part of 
the military.(6) 
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As concerns the role of the military profession v1s-a-
v1s the civilian bureaucrat in the determination of strategy, 
much has been said already.(7) It needs to be stressed, 
however, that the field of strategy is now so broad, and the 
requirements for national strategy so complex, that there is 
a role for each to play ( just as there is for the interested 
academic and citizen). However, it would seem that the 
military profession neither has been given nor has been keen 
to accept much responsibility in this matter. Particularly 
1n the field of military strategy the influence and authority 
of the civilian bureaucrat over the military is apparent. 
The debate as to whether this has occurred by civilian design 
or military default is largely irrelevant. The fact that 
this situation exists is evidence enough to show that the 
military profession has been found lacking, or at least 
unconvincing, in matters of strategic thinking. Particularly 
at the level of coordinating strategy (refer chapter 2) the 
military will need to 'lift its game' if it wishes to carry 
more weight in helping determine a viable and coherent 
strategy for Australia. To this end the words of Funnell are 
prophetic: 
The military profession in Australia 
must make a quite fundamental adjus-
tment. A combat orientation is primary 
and predominant but it is not an end in 
itself and it must not be allowed to 
dominate practices and procedures as it 
has to date. The profession must accom-
modate to political and organisational 
realities. If professional military 
advice is to receive due weight in defe-
nce decision-making at the highest le-
vels military professionals must be 
developed who possess the political 
managerial and bureaucratic skills 
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needed to operate effectively in the 
organisational environment of the 
1980s. ( 8) 
If the Australian military profession wishes to enhance its 
strategic thinking and have a greater impact in the determi-
nation of strategy then it needs to give more attention to 
its advisory and representative responsibilities, as well as 
maintaining its executive responsibility in which it has 
established a proud record (refer chapter 1). 
Inter-Service Relations 
The shallowness of strategic thinking within the 
military profession becomes clear when inter-service 
relations are examined. Ignorance of and rivalry between the 
services are unfortunate features of the ADF, but they are 
features also which indicate a lack of strategic thinking 
within the profession. In an age of joint operations nothing 
could be clearer than the need for the services to provide a 
united front in finally determining defence priorities and 
strategic concepts to enhance Australia's national security. 
However, the findings of the Utz Committee suggests that 
inter-service rivalry is a far greater problem than even the 
question of civilian-military relations within the 
Department.( 9) Indeed, there is a strong case for arguing 
that civilian aurhority is so pronounced only because of 
inter-service rivalry. There is constant competition between 
the services for the allocation of scarce resources. Given 
the historic and separate development of the three services 
(or four, if one includes the Public Service) this situation 
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perhaps is understandable, but it is hardly appropriate for 
the development of national and military strategy. 
It is probable that inter-service rivalry will continue 
and strategic thinking in the profession remain stifled as 
long as the services remain ignorant of and isolated from 
each other, and as long as they perceive the need to compete 
with each other for the allocation of scarce resources. That 
ignorance and isolation exist there can be little doubt. 
Incidents such as the failure of Navy Office to use the 
weight of an armed soldier to determine accurate weight 
requirements for the construction of the Landing Craft Vehic-
le Personnel (LCVP) for HMAS Tobruk,(lO) and more recently 
the RAN's failure to consult with the other services for the 
acquisition of low level air defence weapons for the Freman-
tle-class patrol boats,(11) tend to confirm this view. 
. Another example of isolationism within the services was 
demonstrated by Army in its writing of the Army Development 
Guide (ADG). Preparation of the ADG began in earnest in 1981 
and as the name implies its purpose was to establish how the 
Army should by structured and employed in the future. The ADG 
was an ambitious task undertaken because senior Army officers 
felt there was insufficient guidance (both from within Army 
andfrom existing higher level documents on strategic 
assessment and force structure development (l 2 )) . concerning 
the way in which the Army should be structured and equipped. 
The force structure derived in the ADG rested heavily on 
Army's perception of the strategic environment in which 
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Australian land forces are likely to operate. However, this 
assessment was derived by Army without consultation with the 
other services, SIP, FDA or JIO. The ADG was very much an 'in 
house' document whose authors worked under instructions not 
to discuss its contents with the other services or with 
civilian bureaurats within the Department. 
This should not be interpreted as a case for the unifi-
cation of the services along (say) Canadian lines. As 
explained in chapter 2 the complexity of war suggests that 
three distinct services are required. However, there 1s a 
case for improved coordination between the services and for 
an end to the attitude that each service's gain is another's 
loss. Each service should see itself as one part of the ADF 
and the force structure and capability of each should be 
justified always in terms of the overall strategic posture of 
the ADF. 
In recent years steps have been taken to reduce inter-
service rivalry and improve strategic thinking within the 
ADF. These steps have included: the establishment of the 
position of CDF and progressively the increased importance 
given him and his staff;(l3) the establishment of JSSC, 
AJWE and ADFA; and the enhanced attention given to joint 
operations by each of the services. Overall, however, prog-
ress in strategic thinking has been slow, with each service 
giving higher priority to the preservation of its own image 
and identity than to the development and requirements of the 
ADF as a whole. As a consequence strategic thinking has 
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become subordinated to vested interests, perhaps no more 
clearly exposed than in some of 'the byzantine machinations 
surrounding the justifications advanced for acquisition of an 
aircraft carrier'.(l4) 
If strategic thinking within the services is to be 
enhanced in the future then it would seem that inter-service 
relations need to be improved. As with the question concer-
ning the role of the military in strategic thinking, inter-
service relations also seem destined to improve only given 
proper education within the military profession. It is to 
this vital area that most attention needs to be given by the 
profession for its future development in strategic thinking. 
Military Education and Strategic Thinking 
In chapter 3 it was explained that efforts are being 
made by the military profession to further the study of 
strategic matters, but that overall progress has been slow 
and not particularly well coordinated between the services. 
What, then, is the way for the military to proceed if it is 
to enhance strategic thinking in the profession? Dunn and 
Staudenmaier have commented that 'choices require knowledge 
and knowledge should improve strategy•,(15) but when and how 
should the military set about acquiring this knowledge? 
This question instantly raises another - how many stra-
tegic thinkers does the profession want or need? It 1s 
sometimes argued with conviction that although there may be a 
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requirement for senior officers to be strategic thinkers, 
most officers will in fact not rise to the senior ranks. 
Thus, it is argued, the military predominantly needs men and 
women of Sparta and only few of Athens. In this light 
strategy is often seen as a 'could know' subject, far less 
important in the day to day business of military service than 
matters of tactics, man management and technical knowhow. 
Commanding officers need to know how to command troops and 
their junior officers need to know how to sail ships, fight 
on the battlefield and fly aeroplanes. In essence the heads 
of young officers do not need to be filled with grand theo-
ries of strategy that have little relevance to their actual 
employment. 
This is a seductive argument but it seems to miss the 
crucial point that strategists, like generals, are made and 
not born. Because strategy remains (at least partly) the art 
of the general, it is important that the study of strategy 
should start sooner rather than later in the officer's 
career. It is a fact that as essential as Spartans are to 
every nation and its defence force~ many of the Spartan 
skills are procedural in nature and are learnt effectively 
only by practice. This is what in common parlance . lS 
referred to as on-the-job training, and there seems to be no 
suitable alternative to it. 
The approach to be taken at ADFA and RMC of A (refer 
chapter 3) towards developing strategic thinking in cadets is 
Athenian in nature and is an attempt by the military profes-
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s1on to develop an appreciation of strategy at a formative 
stage in an officer's career. This approach is laudable but 
it carries with it the danger, so frequently reinforced 1n 
many military courses, that complex matters either can be 
simplified into a short list of fundamental principles, or 
covered adequately by an endless sequence of disparate lec-
tures. Such an approach will do little to develop strategic 
thinking in the profession and could well have the opposite 
effect. Somehow a course needs to be developed and presented 
that provides cadets with some basic knowledge, but which 
also encourages and requires them individually to assess the 
relevance and importance of strategy now and for the future. 
There is a tendency in the military to design and pro-
vide courses in order to help prepare officers for subsequent 
promotion or job. There is much sense in this approach, but 
it is probable that strategy cannot be understood or covered 
adequately in this way. In his review of senior officer 
development Butler concluded that there exists a lack of 
strategic thinking in the Australian military profession and 
that partly because of this many senior officers are ill 
prepared for high office.( 16 ) Butler recommended that an NDC 
be established in Australia to help redress this problem.(l 7 ) 
Certainly there is merit in Butler's proposal, but equally it 
might be argued that other alternatives exist at this time 
that also need to be explored. One wonders if attendance at 
an NDC may occur too late in an officer's career to have 
him/her think strategically: or whether instruction and prob-
lem consideration on strategic matters at an NDC would be any 
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less shallow than that which Butler observed occurring at the 
single service Staff Colleges and Jssc.(18) The value of an 
NDC in enhancing strategic thinking in the military profes-
sion is tempered by Brodie's assessment that although it 
visibly raises the horizons of the offi-
cers who pass through it; .•• the trai-
ning is too brief, too casual, comes too 
late in life, and keeps the military 
consorting with each other.(19) 
There are other avenues open to the military to promote 
strategic thinking which require examination as well as the 
NDC proposal. These include such things as defence fellow-
ships, sabbatical or study leave, civil schooling, and 
research secondments to industry, foreign defence forces and 
defence-related establishments. Furthermore, it may be more 
important for officers to undertake such training in the 
middle stage of their careers (refer chapter 3) instead of in 
the late stage which the NDC option requires. 
Yet another alternative which would require . serious 
consideration is the establishment of a School of Strategy 
which could help coordinate inter-service requirements and 
promote strategic thinking within the profession. Several 
options exist each of which would need to be examined 
carefully: for example the School could be an offshoot of 
JSSC, or AJWE or the NDC (if the latter was established). 
However, perhaps a more practical option would be to estab-
lish a Chair of Strategy ( or Strategic Studies or similar) 
at ADFA by combining those courses already offered in the 
Politics and History Departments, and expanding them to 
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include such topics as military technology, military econo-
mics, defence infrastructure, military geography and military 
sociology. In Chapter 1 it was shown that strategy is a 
practical subject that demands, eventually, a course of 
action to be chosen. However, strategy is also a complex 
subject that is best learnt and pondered in an academic 
environment, free from routine military constraints and given 
time for analysis and reflection. These are attributes not 
easily reproduced 
military courses. 
. 1n the more rigid structure of formal 
A Chair of Strategy at ADFA could help promote strategic 
thinking within the military in several ways. First, because 
of its academic status ADFA would help legitimise study in 
such matters, and quite likely the products of its research 
may attract significant credibility. Second, being non-
partisan to any particular service and by including civilian 
scholars and students, a Chair of Strategy would be able to 
look at strategic matters in a more practical and impartial 
manner than is likely within a closed service environment 
(such as JSSC, etc.). Third, by offering undergraduate and 
postgraduate programmes (perhaps even by correspondence) such 
a Chair would help introduce strategic thinking to young 
officers and provide the opportunity for selected officers to 
continue their studies throughout their career. Not all of 
these studies necessarily need be linked to the gathering of 
degrees (masters, doctorates, etc.); such a Chair would pro-
vide also a suitable venue for the conduct of many research 
projects and defence fellowships. Fourth, a Chair of Strategy 
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would help distinguish ADFA from other universities 1n 
Australia. A legitimate concern of many in the military 1s 
that too much of the ADFA academic curriculum is a mere 
duplication of that existing in other Australian tertiary 
institutions, and because of this it may be more appropriate 
(both socially and economically) to have military officers 
educated in existing civilian universities. However, a Chair 
of Strategy would help provide an education more relevant to 
the needs of the military profession than that offered 
currently in many courses at Australian universities and at 
ADFA. Finally, a Chair of Strategy at ADFA could help guide 
and coordinate the development of strategic thinking at the 
more formal military institutions, such as the single service 
Staff Colleges and JSSC where greater depth of analysis and 
understanding in strategic matters is (according to Butler) 
required. 
Conclusion 
In chapters 1 and 2 it was explained that strategic 
thinking is a complex area of study, particularly in the area 
of military strategy where an understanding is vital if the 
profession wishes to contribute purposefully to the 
determination of strategy. Overall the sub-thesis agrees with 
Butler's recent analysis of senior officer development in 
which he concluded that the Australian military profession 
has little ability to think strategically, but that this 
ability is vital for the profession both now and in the 
future. 
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In chapter 3 it was explained why the Australian 
military profession has failed to develop the art of strate-
gic thinking. However, it was acknowledged also that the 
military is aware of its shortcomings and that it is moving 
towards redressing this inadequacy, albeit in a ponderous and 
uncoordinated (between the services) fashion. 
Finally, this chapter has suggested that if the military 
seriously wishes to improve its ability to think 
strategically then it must look to three particular areas: to 
the actual role that the profession should play in strategic 
decision-making in Australia: to a better understanding of 
inter-service requirements and joint operations: and to the 
manner in which the profession can best be educated 1n 
matters of strategic importance. These issues are all impor-
tan t and require rigorous analysis by the profession. 
Because of their complexity it is possible to become 
despondent about the prospects for change occurring in these 
matters, at least in the short term. However, one can take 
also a more optimistic view. The ADF - like the nation it 
serves - 1s young, and its reputation remains high 
internationally. Its officers are generally well educated and 
trained, and for the most part are capable and articulate. 
Given these favourable circumstances it is probable that 
strategic thinking within the profession will continue to be 
developed, even though the strategic perceptions of a 'no 
threat' environment may tend to dampen the urgency that this 
author believes the matter deserves. 
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occurred during the deliberations of the 
Cross Committee into the state of Australia's defence 
capability (refer Chapter 2, note 49). Although not 
reflected in the Cross Report it is the understanding 
of this author that the CDF was a reluctant witness, 
and was not eager to contribute to the debate as to the 
ADF's current and future structure and capabilities. It 
is noteworthy also that of the 26 written submissions 
presented to the Committee only one came from a senior 
serving officer. 
Refer Chapters 1-3, pp.14-15, 33, 41, 56. 
Funnell (Chapter 3, note 35), p.35. 
Utz Report (Chapter 1, note 30),p.xii, para 5; and 
Brown (Chapter 2, note 44), pp. 57-58, 75-87. 
Brown (Chapter 2, note 44), pp. 23-24, 81. 
Frank Cranston, 'Army to Purchase 60 Swedish Missiles', 
Canberra Times (2 March 1985), p.7. 
These higher level documents principally are the Strat 
Basis and the 'Defence Force Capabilities Paper'. 
The CDF now commands the defence force rather than the 
defence force 'staff', and may do so either through the 
Chiefs of Staff of each service or direct to appointed 
joint force commanders. The staff of the CDF has been 
progressively enlarged, and an ADF Command Centre 
(ADFCC) established to allow the CDF to command the ADF 
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more appropriately. 
14. Brown (Chapter 2, note 44), p.81, footnote**. 
15. Dunn and Staudenmaier (Chapter 2, note 43), p.13. 
16. Refer Chapter 3, P. 88. 
17. ibid 
18. ibid p. 89. 
19. Brodie (Chapter 1, note 7), p. 486, footnote 54. 
/1, 
115 
---
SOME DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
OF STRATEGY 
Appendix l 
The following is only a selection of definitions and 
descriptions of the word 'strategy', listed under one of 
three headings: 'strategy-general', 'national strategy' and 
'military strategy'. The determination of under what 
heading each definition/description should occur is 
arbitrary, largely reflecting this author's interpretation of 
the original author's intention. As can be seen, the 
division between these groupings is not always clear. 
STRATEGY-GENERAL 
( l ) 
~ Andre Beaufre 
1. Strategy is not a single defined doctrine; it 1s a 
method of thought, the object of which is to codify events, 
set them in order of priority and then choose the most 
effective course of action. 
2. Strategy can in fact be reduced to universal Einstein-
type formula as follows: 
S = KFut 
K is any specific factor applicable to the case concerned; F 
stands for material force; u for the pyschological factor and 
t for time. In direct strategy the predominant factor is F, 
the factor u of considerably less importance and the factor 
t comparatively small. In indirect strategy the exact 
reverse is the case, the dominant factor being u. 
( 2 ) 
Bernard Brodie 
Strategy is a field where truth is sought in pursuit of 
viable solutions. 
( 3 ) 
Henry E. Eccles 
Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to 
control situations and areas to attain broad objectives. 
( 4 ) 
Hanrieder and Buel 
The art of developing and using political, economic, 
psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace 
and war to afford maximum support to policies and in order 
in war to increase the probabilities and favourable 
consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. 
( 5 ) 
Woodford A. Heflin 
The art or science of using such factors as time, 
space, geography, politics, and trends of events, together 
with available or potential power, to achieve a previously 
conceived objective; or the use of these factors to create 
advantageous conditions for meeting the enemy in combat, 
either to compel surrender or to achieve some other 
objective. 
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JSP (AS) 101 (A) - Glossary (6) 
The art and-science of developing and using political, 
economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary 
during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to 
policies, in order to increase the probabilities and 
favourable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances 
of defeat. 
Robert O'Neill (7) 
Strategy is an art rather than a science: it involves 
intuition, judgements of imprecise data and comprehension of 
a multitude of factors bearing on any situation. 
Schwarz and Hadik (8) 
There 
strategy. 
emphasis the 
are thousands of definitions of the term 
They vary in time and place and according to the 
author wants to give to one or other aspect. 
Shelburne and Groves (9) 
Ultimately, the end of strategy is to influence the 
opponent's decisions. 
Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie (10) 
Strategy is a plan of action designed 
achieve some end; a purpose together with 
1n order to 
a system of 
measures for its accomplishment. 
NATIONAL (TOTAL/GRAND) STRATEGY 
Andre Beaufre (11) 
1. The art of applying force so that it makes 
effective contribution towards achieving the ends 
political policy. 
the most 
set by 
2. The art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using 
force to resolve this dispute. 
Edward Mead Earle (12) 
Strategy is the art of controlling and utilising the 
resources of a nation - or a coalition of nations - including 
its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall 
be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, 
potential or merely presumed. 
Hanriederand Buel (13) 
The art and science of developing and using the 
political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, 
together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to 
secure national objectives. 
Jane's Dictionary of Military Terms (14) 
Strategy: The plans for conducting a war in the widest sense 
including diplomatic, political and economic considerations 
as well as those of a purely military nature. 
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JSP (AS) 101 (A) - Glossary(lS) 
The art and science of developing and using political, 
economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with 
its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national 
objectives. 
General Albert C. Wedemeyer (16) 
Grand strategy is the art and science of employing 
all of a nation's resources to accomplish objectives defined 
by national policy. 
MILITARY STRATEGY 
Atkeson ( 1 7) 
Military strategy is the art of generals, 
strategy is the art of statesmen. 
Joseph M. Califf (18) 
national 
Strategy is the planning of a campaign and the 
determining of the character, direction, and object to be 
attained by military operations, and embraces all operations 
prior to actual tactical collision. 
Karl Von Clausewitz(l9) 
The art of the employment of battles as a means to gain 
the object of war. In other words strategy forms the plan of 
the war, maps out the proposed course of the different 
campaigns which compose the war, and regulates the battles to 
be fought in each. 
Concise Oxford Dictionary(20) 
Generalship, the art of war; management of an army or 
armies in a campaign; art of so moving or disposing troops 
or ships as to impose upon the enemy the place and time and 
conditions for fighting preferred by oneself. 
John Garnett(21) 
... examines the way in which military power is used by 
governments in pursuit of their interests. 
Hanrieder and Buel (22) 
The art and science of employing military power under 
all circumstances to attain national security objectives by 
applying force or the threat of force. 
Antoine Henri Jomini (23) 
The art of directing the greater part of the forces of 
an army on to the most important point of a theatre of war, 
or a zone of operations. 
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(24) 
JSP (AS) 101 (A) Glossary 
The art and science of employing the armed forces 
nation to secure the objectives of national policy by 
application of force, or the threat of force. 
( 2 5 ) 
B.H. Liddell-Hart 
of a 
the 
The art of distributing and applying military means to 
fulfil the ends of policy. 
( 2 6 ) 
Robert E. Osgood 
Military strategy must now be understood as nothing 
less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for 
armed coercion - in conjunction with the economic, 
diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power - to 
support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and 
tacit means. 
( 2 7 ) 
Soviet Military Encyclopaedia 
Military strategy is defined as 'the component part of 
military art, its highest field, which encompasses the theory 
and practice of the preparation of a country and its armed 
forces for war, the planning and conduct of war and the 
strategic operations'. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Beaufre (Chapter 1, note 1), pp.13,129. 
2. Cited in James A. Bowden, 'The RDJTF and Doctrine', 
Military Review (November 1982), p.59. 
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4. 
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6. 
Eccles (Chapter 2, note 6), p.70. 
William F. Hanrieder and Larry V. Buel, Words and Arms: 
A Dictionary of Security and Defense Terms (Westview, 
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JSP (AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), p.1.248. 
7. O'Neill (Chapter 1, note 3), p.30. 
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9. Shelburne and Groves (Chapter 3, note 59), p.85. 
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(Chapter 1, note 14), p.1.173. 
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of War (Republican Publishing Co., Iowa, 1889), p.64. 
19. Cited in B.H. Liddell-Hart, 
Approach (Faber and Faber, 
1967), p.333. 
Strategy. The Indirect 
London, fourth edition, 
20. Concise Oxford Dictionary 
p.1252. 
(fourth edition, 1959), 
21. John Garnett, 'The Nature of Strategic Studies', in 
John Baylis et al, Contemporary Strategy. Theories 
and Policies ~room Helm, London, 1976), p.3. 
22. Hanrieder and Buel (Appendix 1, note 4), p.71. 
23. Cited in Michael Howard (Chapter 2, note 34), p.33. 
24. JSP (AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), p.l.164. 
25. B.H. Liddell-Hart (Appendix 1, note 19), p.335. 
26. Cited in Lider (Chapter 1, note 12), p.194. 
2 7. Cited in Lider (Chapter 1, note 12), p.268. Lider 
analyses this rather amorphous definition and explains 
its elements. For a fuller description of Soviet 
military strategy see Scott (Chapter 1, note 3), 
pp.xvii-xviii, 1-24. 
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MAIN TYPES OF MILITARY STRATEGIES 
AND MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN 
THEIR SELECTION 
TYPES OF MILITARY STRATEGY 
Nuclear Warfare 
Appendix 2 
Nuclear warfare involves the procurement, deployment, 
threat and possible use of strategic nuclear weapons ~as 
distinct from tactical/battlefield nuclear weapons). 
Nuclear strategy at present is concerned principally with the 
relationship between the superpowers (USA and USSR) in what 
is often called the 'central balance'. Other major powers, 
principally PRC, UK and France, are also capable of 
threatening and fighting a nuclear war. The basic 
distinction between nuclear warfare strategies and other 
military strategies is the degree of importance placed on 
'deterrence.' Although deterrence has validity in all types 
of military strategy the effects of nuclear war are 
potentially so horrific as to increase the importance placed 
upon deterrence or war avoidance. The USSR officially has 
not embraced a strategy of deterrence (claiming instead that 
nuclear warfare is an extension of conventional war), but in 
actuality it has been party to the maintenance of a deterrent 
strategy. Perhaps ironically, the credibility of deterrence 
has rested on the continued advance in nuclear weapon 
capabilities and the continuous revision of war fighting 
strategies on both sides. For an explanation of the 
development of nuclear warfare and discussion about the 
various strategies see (among others) Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy(Macmillan, London, 1981). 
Unlimited General Warfare 
This type of strategy involves 'armed conflict between 
major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents 
are employed and the national survival of the belligerents is 
in jeopardy.' (1) Such wars are unlimited in the sense that 
they may include nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical) and 
they involve and/or effect nations other than the principal 
belligerents. World Wars 1 and 2 are examples of unlimited 
general warfare, albeit without greatly being effected by 
nuclear weapons. 
Limited Conventional Warfare 
The features of limited conventional warfare are that 
the conflict is confined or limited to a local geographical 
area, involving only two or a small number of nations, and 
where strategic nuclear weapons are not used. Some writers 
believe also that biological and chemical weapons cannot 
be used in limited conventional warfare,(2) but this would 
seem to be too narrow an interpretation. Examples of 
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limited conventional warfare include the Korean War, the 
Indo-Pakistani Wars, the Middle East Wars (Israel-Egypt 
etc.), and the Iran-Iraq War. The current definition of 
'limited war' in JSP (AS) 101 (A)is imprecise and conveys 
little meaning. (3) Hanrieder and Buel have described 
limited war as 
armed encounters, exclusive of incidents, in which 
one or more major powers or their proxies 
voluntarily exercise various types and degrees of 
restraint to prevent unmanageable escalation. (4) 
This accords with the definition offerred by Osgood. (5) 
Both these interpretations, however, fail to recognise that 
limited wars may occur other than between (one or more) major 
powers; and they fail to acknowledge that non-major powers so 
involved may not exercise restraint at all, but with the 
resources available to them are unable (and often don't wish) 
to escalate the conflict beyond the conventional limited 
threshold. 
Unconventional Warfare 
Unconventional warfare is a broad category encompassing 
all strategies not inlcluded in the other three types. JSP 
(AS) 101 (A) defines unconventional warfare as a: 
General term used to describe operations conducted 
for military, political or economic purposes 
within an area occupied by the enemy and making 
use of the local inhabitants and resources. (6) 
Hanrieder and Buel provide a more comprehensive description 
of unconventional warfare: 
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary 
operations conducted in enemy held, enemy denied 
or politically sensitive territory. 
Unconventional warfare includes, but is not 
limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla 
warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, 
direct action missions, and other operations of a 
low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. 
These interrelated aspects of unconventional 
warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively 
by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually 
supported and directed in varying degrees by 
external sources during all conditions of war and 
peace. (7) 
In addition, unconventional warfare includes such activities 
as terrorism and partisan operations. It also involves the 
derivation of strategies to counteract all the 
activities mentioned above, for example 'counter-insurgency 
operations' and 'counter terrorist operations'. The 
concept of unconventional warfare also may be extended to 
include methods of non-military defence. (8) 
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TYPES OF STRATEGY 
Appendix 2 
In selecting one or more of the above strategy-types 
nations need to consider the following six questions. 
Alliance and/or Neutrality 
To what extent does the nation want or need to be 
allied? Is the alliance designed principally to protect the 
nation's vital interests or to help provide protection 
for the other partner(s)? Is the nation capable of being 
neutral? Is it capable of maintaining a strong alliance? 
To what extent does the adoption of one of these alternatives 
(alliance or neutrality) affect the size, shape and readiness 
of the defence forces? 
Deterrent and/or War Fighting 
Does the nation wish to deter conflict or to further 
its interests by military threat or aggression? Against who 
or what are deterrence and/or war fighting strategies 
designed? Can military deterrence be achieved without 
proper war fighting preparations? Are nuclear and 
conventional deterrence similar and plausible strategies? 
What are the force structures required to achieve them? 
Direct and/or Indirect 
Is military force the principal means by which the 
nation wishes to maintain security (ie direct strategy)? Or, 
is security to be maintained primarily by less direct 
methods, for example political and economic strategies (ie 
indirect strategy)? If indirect strategy is chosen then 
what types of military strategy and what force structures are 
required? Does provision need to be made in the force 
structure to change from indirect to direct strategy? If 
so, how long will this take? 
Maritime and/or Continental and/or Aerospace 
What are the maritime, continental and aerospace 
capabilities required by a nation to maintain national 
security? Which if any is to be predominant and why? How 
can they be coordinated to provide a viable military strategy 
in concert with national objectives? 
Offensive and/or Defensive 
Should the military be structured and strategies be 
chosen that are essentially offensive or defensive? To 
what extent is it possible to devise offensive and defensive 
strategies? What emphasis should be placed on 
strategic strike and preemptive strike capabilities? In what 
ways can the three services be structured and coordinated for 
these strategies? To what extent should the 
services be integrated with or offset by civil defence 
measures? 
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Sequential and/or Cumulative (9) 
To what extent should strategic contingency planning be 
sequential and/or cumulative? Is it possible to devise 
sequential and cumulative strategies that are realistic 
before actual military situations develop? Given resolution 
of the previous five considerations,should the nation adopt a 
predominantly sequential or cumulative strategy? 
l . 
2. 
3. 
ENDNOTES 
JSP(AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), p.1.110; 
Hanrieder and Buel (Appendix 1, note 4), p. 51. 
and 
For example, Hayward (Appendix 1, 
limited war as 'a conflict of greater 
guerilla war but one in which NBC 
used.' (p. 97). 
note 14) defines 
intensity than 
weapons are not 
JSP (AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), defines limited 
war as 'armed conflict short of general war, exclusive 
of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the 
military forces of two or more nations.' (p.1.147) 
4. Hanrieder and Buel (Appendix 1, note 4), p.66. 
5. Robert E. Osgood, Limited War. The Challenge to 
American Strategy (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1957), pp. 1-2. 
6. JSP (AS) 101 (A) (Chapter 1, note 14), p.1.270. 
7. Hanrieder and Buel (Appendix 1, note 4), p.133. 
8. 
9. 
See, for example, Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War 
Without Weapons. Non-Violence in National Defense 
(Schacken, New York, 1975). 
The distinction between sequential and cumulative 
strategy is explained in Wylie (Chapter 1, note 40), 
pp. 23-29. Basically, sequential strategy is 
progressive with each successive step being determined 
by the outcome of the previous step. Sequential 
strategy needs to be planned, but its implementation 
depends on the success or failure of each phase of the 
campaign. Examples of sequential strategy include 
MacA~thur's campaign in the south-west Pacific, the 
allied drive towards Germany from the Normandy 
landings, and the German drive into Russia. Cumulative 
strategy is the collection of lesser or individual 
actions which are largely independent of previous 
actions. Examples of this strategy include the German 
submarine campaign during World War 2, or perhaps the 
air battle over Britain. Cumulative strategy is 
suitable particularly for maritime and air 
(including missiles) operations, for commando-type 
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operations, guerrilla and partisan warfare, and 
terrorism. Cumulative strategy requires fastidious 
planning (as does sequential) but generally can be 
implemented free from the constraints that sequential 
strategy may suffer. Wylie suggests that one of the 
problems in devising the most suitable military and 
national strategy is to combine sequential and 
cumulative options in the best way. 
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MILITARY COURSES CONCERNED 
WITH STRATEGIC MATTERS 
Appendix 3 
This appendix contains information about the strategy 
component of major military courses conducted currently, or 
planned, within the ADF. These courses are subject to change 
(usually marginally) depending on the availability of 
instructors, the direction of the respective Commandants 
or other changing situations (eg. world events largely 
dictates topics for consideration). For this reason the 
year of each course is indicated, and those wishing to update 
this would need to refer to the relevant handbook and/or 
liaise with the relevant establishment. Other courses, such 
as the Industrial Mobilisation Course, which are of strategic 
importance have not been mentioned because they generally 
affect only a few officers, are not currently considered 
important in an officer's career progression, and could not 
be assessed by the author in the time available. Such 
courses also may require scrutiny. 
Appendix 3 contains the following: 
a. Appendix 3.1 - Intended ADFA Academic Courses 
Strategic Importance, 1986 
of 
b. Appendix 3.2 - ADFA Common Military Curriculum. 
Proposed Course in Defence Studies, 1986 
c. Appendix 3.3 - Strategy Component of Military 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
1 • 
Appendix 3.4 
Appendix 3.5 
Appendix 3.6 
Appendix 3.7 
Appendix 3.8 
Appendix 3.9 
Curricula: RANC, RMCofA, RAAF Academy 
- Proposed Course in Strategic Studies, 
RMCofA, Duntroon, 1986 
- Strategy 
Balmoral, 
Component, 
1984 
- Strategy Component, 
Queenscliff, 1984 
- Strategy Component, 
Fairbairn, 1985 
RAN Staff College, 
Army C&SC, Fort 
RAAF Staff College, 
- JSSC Course, 1984 (Course 29/84) 
- Army Strategic and Operational Study 
Period (SOSP), 1984. 
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INTENDED ADFA ACADEMIC COURSES OF 
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 1986 
The courses listed are those that are related directly 
to the study of strategy. Of course many aspects of science, 
engineering and the humanities ultimately may have a bearing 
on strategic capability, but they are not concerned 
specifically with the study of strategy. 
Department of History 
a. Revolution, War and Ideology in Modern Europe. 
b. The Evolution of Modern War. 
c. War and Society in Austalia. 
d. Revolts and Counter-Insurgency in South-East Asia. 
e. War and Revolution in East Asia. 
f. (Additional subjects for honours students, to be 
determined). 
Department of Politics 
a. Civil-Military Relations. 
b. The International System. 
c. International Relations of South-East Asia. 
d. Strategic Studies. 
e. International Relations of North-East Asia. 
f. 
g. 
Law and War. 
Maritime Law. 
Source: 'University College - ADFA. 
1986', dated 22 May 1984 
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ADFA COMMON MILITARY CURRICULUM 
PROPOSED COURSE IN DEFENCE STUDIES, 1986 
SUBJECT AREA 
Military History 
Strategy 
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REQUIREMENT 
Explain the 
of military history 
'Profession of Arms'. 
importance 
to the 
Outline the character and style 
of selected commanders that 
have been involved in military 
conflict. 
Assess the aspects of 
character and style of 
nominated military commanders 
that influenced the outcome of 
battle. 
Outline Australia's military 
role in the following wars: 
a. Boer War. 
b. First World War. 
c. Second World War. 
d. Korean War. 
e. Vietnam War. 
Outline the development of the 
Australian Services and Defence 
Forces. 
Outline 
'strategy'. 
the concept of 
Explain how military 
is derived from 
policy. 
strategy 
national 
Outline the factors that 
determine a country's strategic 
situation. 
Outline the theories of the 
great strategists. 
Outline the evolution of 
strategy and warfare (with 
emphasis on the 20th Century). 
3. Operations 
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Discuss the contemporary 
relevance of the Principles of 
War to the application of 
military power. 
Explain the meaning of tactics, 
logistics, strategy, national 
policy and military strategy. 
Outline some of the effects 
that politics, society and 
economics have had on the 
conduct of some recent 
military conflicts. 
Analyse selected military 
campaigns and operations on the 
basis of applied military 
strategy. 
Analyse the conduct of 
operations using the following 
elements of a systems model: 
environment, information, 
weapon's power logistics and 
control. 
Describe the 
technology on 
operations. 
influence 
the conduct 
of 
of 
Describe the effect of selected 
new weapons systems on the 
conduct of operations. 
Outline the development of 
joint operations. 
Outline the planning process 
associated with the development 
and implementation of small 
scale joint exercises. 
Describe the effects of the 
fire support available to the 
ADF. 
Produce an outline plan for a 
small scale joint operation in 
a limited war. 
4. 
I 
I 
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5. 
International Politics 
Australia's Strategic 
Situation 
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Discuss the background 
current world events 
significance to Australia. 
to 
of 
Explain the implication for 
Australia of selected aspects 
of the foreign policies of: 
a. USA, 
b. USSR, 
c. PRC, and 
d. Japan. 
Explain the influence of the 
maJor powers on world 
stability. 
Discuss the relations between 
the above major powers. 
Outline the possible implic-
ations for Australia of: 
a. the political influences 
in the SW Pacific area; 
b. the military balance in: 
(1) SE Asia, and 
(2) The Indian Ocean and 
its littoral States; 
and 
c. instability in the Middle 
East. 
Outline the role of ASEAN and 
its potential for assisting 
stability in the region. 
Outline Australia's 
the Five Powers 
Arrangements. 
role in 
Defence 
Outline the purpose and 
operation of the Defence 
operation Program. 
broad 
Co-
Discuss 
between 
Zealand. 
the relationships 
Australia and New 
Discuss the aims of Australia's 
current defence policy. 
Outline the functions and roles 
of the ADF and its Services. 
Source: 
Appendix 3.2 
Outline the higher command and 
control of the ADF. 
Explain the significance of 
Australia's defence treaties 
and agreements. 
Discuss Australia's strategic 
situation. 
Discuss the concepts of the 
'Fortress Australia' and 
'Forward Defence' policies. 
Discuss areas which highlight 
aspects of the Defence Studies 
programme. 
Explain some of the 
difficulties involved in 
defending areas of Australia. 
Assess the national signif-
icance of nominated industries. 
adapted from ADFA 'Common Military Training 
Curriculum, Defence Studies', c. January 1985. 
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STRATEGY COMPONENT OF MILITARY 
CURRICULA: RANC, RMCofA, RAAF ACADEMY 
RANC, Jervis Bay, 1984 
1. Professional naval training includes instruction/study 
in naval history and maritime aviation, depending on officer 
category. 
2. The Humanities Department also offers courses on: 
a. War and Society in the 20th Century, and 
b. Conflict and Order in World Politics. 
Source: 'Royal Australian Naval College, Jervis Bay, Calendar 
1984'. 
RMCofA, Duntroon, 1985 
1. The Military Studies course includes the following: 
a. Military History. Central instruction is based on 
teaching cadets how to use history to complement 
their professional studies. Cadets study a 
specific aspect of military history on an elective 
basis and prepare both a paper and a presentation 
on their chosen subject. 
b. Strategic Studies. This subject introduces 
cadets to strategy and provides an understanding 
of the military, political and geographical 
considerations relevant to the defence of 
Australia. It assists cadets to understand 
significant events in Australia's areas of 
interest and encourages cadets to discuss these 
events in both formal and informal groups. 
2. Academic courses relevant to strategy are almost the 
same as those listed in Appendix 3.1 for ADFA. 
Source: 'The Royal Military College and Faculty of Military 
Studies Handbook, 1985'. 
RAAF Academy, Point Cook, 1982 
1. Professional training includes a short course on 
Military Studies. The scope of the course is as follows: 
'An introduction to the nature and principles of war and 
their application to the Australian Defence environment. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the employment of Air Power 
at squadron level and the role of Air Power in Joint 
Operations and in national defence planning.' 
Source: 'Royal Australian Air Force Academy, 
Handbook 1982'. 
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PROPOSED COURSE IN STRATEGIC STUDIES 
RMC OF A, DUNTROON, 1986 
Appendix 3.4 
The details of this course are yet to be finalised. 
However, it is currently planned that this course will be 
compulsory for all cadets, covering approximately 60 periods 
of instruction. The proposed course has three 
seminars/components as follows: 
a. 
b. 
C • 
Source: 
The Development of Strategic Thinking 
( l ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
( 4) 
( 5 ) 
( 6 ) 
Scope of Strategic Studies 
Milestones in Strategic Thinking 
Armed Forces and the State 
Warrior Caste Versus Constabulary Force 
Direct and Indirect Strategy 
Total War and Limited War 
( 7 ) 
( 8) 
Nuclear Strategy and the Central Balance 
Conventional Strategy and the Operational Level 
of War 
( 9) Unconventional Warfare and Non-Conventional 
Strategies 
( l O) Terrorism, Transnational and Sub-national 
( 11) 
( 12) 
( 13) 
Violence 
Peacekeeping 
Peace Research and Arms Control 
Defence Decision-Making 
Regional Strategic Balances 
(1) Europe 
(2) Middle East/Gulf 
(3) North-East Asia 
(4) South and South-East Asia 
(5) South-West Pacific 
Australia's Strategic Environment 
(1) Australia's Strategic Environment 
(2) Rationale and Determinants for Australia's 
Defence Policy 
(3) Australia's Defence Infrastructure 
(4) Force Expansion and Mobilisation 
(5) Civil-Military Relationship 
(6) Preparation of Army for Australia's Defence 
'(DRAFT) Strategic Studies Course,RMCofA, 
(Provided by RMCofA Writing Team.) 
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STRATEGY COMPONENT, RAN STAFF 
COLLEGE, BALMORAL, 1984 
Appendix 3.5 
The aim of the strategy component is to develop 
students' knowledge and understanding of the world, regional 
and national environments and the factors which determine and 
influence the formulation of Australia's national and 
maritime strategies. 
Programme 
The strategy component is comprised of the following 
elements: 
a. The World Environment 
b. 
(1) World Economic Trends 
(2) World Resources 
(3) World Order and the Strategic Nuclear Balance 
(4) Superpower Perspective - USA 
(5) Superpower Perspective - USSR 
(6) Significant World Ideologies 
The Regional Environment 
(1) North Asian Region 
(2) Indian Ocean Region 
(3) South-East Asian Region 
(4) South-West Pacific and New Zealand 
(5) Near Northern Region 
c. The National Environment 
d. 
(1) Australia's National Aims and Interests 
(2) Maritime Aspects of Australia's Foreign Policy 
(3) Contemporary Australian Society 
(4) Development of Australian Politics 
(5) Development and Structure of the Australian 
Economy 
(6) Australia's Economic Prospects 
(7) Trade Unionism 
(8) Australian Government 
(9) Australia's World and Regional Defence Roles 
and Responsibilities 
Development of a Maritime Strategy 
( l ) Exercise: Developing a Suitable 
Combatant Fleet 
(2) Classical Maritime Strategists 
(3) Current Maritime Strategic Concepts 
(4) Maritime Environment and Marine Research 
(5) International Law 
(6) Naval Law: Peace and War 
(7) Maritime Surveillance Agencies 
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Source: 
( 8,) 
( 9) 
( l O) 
( l l ) 
( 12) 
( 13) 
(14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
( l 7) 
( 18) 
Australia's Maritime Infrastructure 
Regional Maritime Forces 
Naval Control of Shipping 
Australia's Maritime Interests 
Cockatoo Island Dockyard (Visit) 
Maritime Research 
The Roles of the Reserves 
Concepts of Naval Warfare 
Naval Warfare 
Need for a Navy 
A Maritime Strategy for Australia 
'RAN Staff College, Study Three 
and Australia's Strategic 
Interests,Course 12/84' 
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STRATEGY COMPONENT, ARMY C&SC, 
FORT QUEENSCLIFF, 1984 
Appendix 3.6 
~- The aim of the strategy segment is to develop students' 
knowledge of the nature of war and to introduce procedures 
that lead to Australian security policy decisions and 
selected factors which affect them. 
Programme 
The strategy component consists of three segments as 
follows: 
a. Strategy Segment 
b. 
( l ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
( 4) 
( 5 ) 
( 6) 
( 7 ) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
( l O) 
( l l ) 
( 12) 
( l 3 ) 
(14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
( l 7) 
The Armed Forces - Government and 
Opposition Views 
Australia's Political Process 
Historical Development of Defence Policy 
The Government Role in War 
The Government Framework for Australian Defence 
Policy 
The Nature of War 
Introduction to Strategic Thinking 
The Classical Strategists 
The Elements of Power 
A Strategic Assessment for Australia 
Understanding Intelligence 
The Intelligence Community 
The Threat Assessment 
Australia's Areas of Interest 
Technical Intelligence 
Nuclear Deterrence 
A Nuclear and Special Weapons Option for 
Australia 
(18) Conventional Deterrence 
Exercise Full Circle Segment 
The exercise consists of two 10 day study tours of 
Northern and Western Australia to enhance students' 
knowledge of: 
(1) the influence of Australia's geography on 
operations and logistics; 
(2) the capability of Australia's transportation 
and telecommunications infrastructure to 
support military operations; 
(3) the influence of demographic and sociological 
trends on military planning; 
(4) Australia's economic and industrial potential 
in peace and war; and 
(5) the location, facilities, equipment and 
operation of RAN and RAAF Bases in 
Eastern, Northern and Western Australia. 
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c. Force Structure Segment 
( l ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
( 4) 
( 5 ) 
( 6 ) 
( 7 ) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
(10) 
( 11) 
( 12) 
( 13) 
(14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
( l 7) 
( 18) 
( 19) 
(20) 
( 21) 
( 2 2) 
(23) 
(24) 
( 2 5) 
( 2 6) 
Australian Military Strategy 
The Operational Level of War 
National Objectives 
Australian Human Resources 
Australia's Economic Status 
National and Defence Industrial Capacity 
Defence Research and Development 
Australia's Communications 
National Transport Resources 
Government Finance 
Financial Programming and Estimates 
Development of Defence Capabilities 
Development of Army Capabilities 
National Mapping 
Army Manpower Planning 
The Army Development Guide 
Army Works Policy 
Army Personnel Policy 
Army Materiel Policy 
Army Logistics Policy 
Army Operations Policy 
Visit to Local Defence Industry 
Strategic and International Policy 
CINCPAC Presentation 
Exercise on Procedures Required to Procure 
Army Equipment 
Exercise on Preparation, Deployment and 
Maintenance of Joint Force for Operations. 
'C&SC Strategy Study Guide, 1984' 
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COLLEGE, FAIRBAIRN, 1985 
Appendix 3.7 
International Politics and World Events Segment 
a. The Strength of a Nation 
b. International Organisations 
c. International System of States 
d. International Law 
e. Ideologies 
f. World Trade 
g. The World Economy 
h. Government Policy Formulation - UK and USA 
i. Major Power Relations: USSR, PRC, USA 
j. Major Power Foreign Policies 
(1) USA 
(2) USSR 
(3) PRC 
(4) Japan 
k. Foreign Policies of: 
(1) Vietnam 
(2) Indonesia 
( 3) PNG 
1. Regional Relations and Strategic Significance: 
(1) Indian Ocean 
(2) South-East Asia 
(3) South-West Pacific 
(4) North-East and East Asia 
(5) ASEAN 
Strategy Segment 
a. Security Needs 
b. The Reasons for War 
c. The Nature of Strategy 
d. Evolution of Strategy 
e. Land Strategy 
f. Maritime Strategy 
g. Air Strategy 
h. Guerrilla Strategy 
i. Influence of Technology on Strategy 
j. Conventional Warfare - Future Trends 
Australian Segment 
a. Australia's Machinery of Government 
b. Australia in International Organisations 
c. Australia's Foreign Policy 
d. Development of Australia's Foreign Policy 
e. Australia's Trade Relations 
f. Australian Government Policy Formulation 
g. Australia's Aims and Interests 
h. Australian Society and National Power 
i. The Constitutional Basis of Australian Government 
j. Roles of Constituent Parts of Australian Government 
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k. Influences on Government 
(1) The Media 
(2) Employer Groups 
(3) Trade Unions 
1. Australia's Defence Policy 
m. Alternative Defence Policies 
n. ALP Foreign and Defence Policies 
o. Liberal Party Foreign and Defence Policies 
p. Australia's Strategic Situation 
q. Strategic Guidance 
r. Capabilities Guidance 
s. National Intelligence Community 
t. The Australian Economy 
u. Economic Factors - Australia's Industrial Structure 
v. Australia's Industrial Relations and Industrial 
Structure 
w. Mobilisation 
x. Wartime Industrial Capacity 
y. Defence Research and Defence Related Industry 
z. Australia's Internal Threats 
Exercises 
a. Exercise STRATEGIST - an evaluation of a 
selected Australian policy for national security. 
b. Exercise ATLAS - an evaluation of selected world issues 
and their significance to Australia. Students are formed 
into sub-syndicates to study and give a presentation on 
the following: 
(1) East Timor - past, present and future 
(2) Kampuchea - can it survive 
(3) Vietnam - nature and consequences of expansion 
(4) Burma - isolationism and survivability 
(5) US-Philippines Connection 
(6) Japan - rearmament 
(7) Northern Ireland - the future 
(8) China and USSR - future relations 
( 9) 
( l O) 
( l l ) 
( 12) 
( 13) 
Iran versus Iraq - likely outcome and consequences 
Saudi Arabia - influence on stability 
Afghanistan - Soviet long term interests 
India - can it remain a democracy 
Nuclear Free Indian Ocean - prospects 
consequences 
(14) South Africa - future of white society 
(15) Africa - Soviet Influence 
(16) Central America - threat to USA 
Visits 
a. Industrial Visit - Sydney - 5 days 
b. National Study - Australia Trip - 2 weeks 
and 
Source: Adapted from 'RAAF Staff College, 
Component, 1985' 
Strategic Studies 
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JSSC COURSE, 1984 (Course 29/84) 
Government, Defence and Strategy 
The aim of this part of the course is to further 
members' knowledge of Government, the Department of Defence, 
the Defence Force and strategic theory. The duration of this 
part of the course is about seven weeks, and the following 
topics of a strategic nature are covered: 
a. 
b. 
C • 
d. 
The Department of Defence 
(1) Australia's Defence 
(2) The Higher Defence Organisation 
(3) The Department of Defence 
(4) Introduction to Joint Operations Doctrine 
(5) The Joint Staff in Support of CDF 
(6) The Officer in Policy Making 
The Process of Government 
(1) Government Policy Formulation 
(2) The Structure of Government 
(3) Civil-Military Relations 
(4) Contemporary Australian Politics 
The Services 
( 1 ) The RAN 
( 2 ) The Australian Army 
( 3) The RAAF 
( 4) The Public Service 
Strategy and Modern Theories of Warfare 
(1) Introduction to Strategic Thinking 
(2) Causes of War 
(3) Crisis Management 
(4) Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence 
(5) Terrorism 
(6) Enduring Strategic Factors 
(7) Strategies of Warfare 
(8) Trends in Warfare 
Influences on National Security Policy 
The aim of this part of the course is to further 
members' understanding and knowledge of the major factors 
influencing Australia's national security policy. The 
duration of this part of the course is about seven weeks, 
which includes a three day industrial tour and about a two 
week overseas tour. The following topics of a strategic 
nature are covered: 
a. International Influences 
(1) World Order and Superpower Relations 
(2) World Economic Trends and International Trade 
(3) World Food, Mineral and Energy Resources 
(4) International Monetary System 
(5) Laws of War 
(6) Laws of the Sea 
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C • 
Regional Influence 
(1) Africa 
(2) Central and South America 
(3) Europe 
(4) Middle East 
(5) South-East Asia 
Appendix 
(6) South-West Asia and Indian Ocean 
(7) South-West Pacific 
(8) Soviet Union 
Domestic Influences 
Australian Security 
Aspects of Social and Economic Change 
Australia's National Objectives 
Factors Affecting Government Policy 
Strategic Assessment 
Australia's Foreign Policy 
3.8 
( l ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
( 6) 
( 7 ) Future Influences on Australia's Security 
Policy 
( 8) 
( 9) 
( l O) 
( 11) 
( 12) 
( 13) 
(14) 
Security Arrangements Involving Australia 
(Treaties etc) 
Australia's Economy 
Australia;s Manufacturing Industry 
Australia's Industrial Relations 
Defence Industry Policy 
Internal Threat 
The Media 
Australian Defence Policy 
The aim of this part of the course is for members to 
study the formulation and administration of Australia's 
defence policy. The duration of this part of the course is 
about five weeks and the following main topics are covered: 
a. 
b. 
Defence Policy Formulation and Decision-Making 
(1) Defence Policy-Making 
(2) Planning in Uncertainty 
(3) Derivation and Consideration of Alternative 
( 4) 
( 5) 
( 6 ) 
( 7 ) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
( l O) 
( 11) 
( 12) 
( 13) 
(14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
Military Strategies for Australia 
National Intelligence 
Leadership Styles and Case Studies 
Decision-Making 
Strategic Guidance 
Role of Analysis in Department of Defence 
Scientific Support for Defence Programmes 
Mobilisation 
Organisational Theory 
Budgets and the FYDP 
Development of Defence Force 
Computers and Management 
Manpower Planning 
Supply and Support 
Defence Facilities 
Capabilities 
Defence Policy Review 
1n 
(1) Government and Opposition Defence Policies 
(2) Alternative View(s) to Defence Policy 
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Joint and Combined Operations 
The aim of this part of the course is for members 
examine the employment of Australian forces in joint 
combined operations. The duration of this part of 
course is about three weeks and the following main topics 
covered: 
a. Command and Control 
(1) National Command and Control 
(2) Joint Service Doctrine and Procedures 
3.8 
to 
and 
the 
are 
(3) Command and Control of Joint and Combined 
Operations 
(4) NATO Command and Control 
b. Planning and Operations 
(1) Contingency Planning 
(2) Exercises Involving Australian Forces in 
Operational Scenarios 
(3) US Operational Interests in Asia/Pacific 
(4) Australian Involvement in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 
and the Sinai 
(5) The Falklands Conflict - A British Perspective 
Source: Adapted from 'JSSC Course 29/84 Study Guides'. 
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ARMY STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL 
STUDY PERIOD (SOSP), 1984 
3.9 
Programme 
DAY 
l . 
2. 
3. 
Source: 
TOPIC 
Strategy 
- military strategy 
- naval/maritime and 
air strategies 
Low Level Conflict 
- Factors influencing military 
involvenent in ... 
- Use of military power in ... 
- Controlling Australia's 
threat environment 
AIM 
To develop an 
understanding of the 
fundamentals of 
Australian military 
strategy 
To develop an 
awareness of the 
political and 
military considerations 
involved in the 
effective employment 
of military force in 
situations short of 
high level conflict. 
High Level Conflict To give an understanding 
- Command and Control of national consider-
Intelligence ations involved in 
Logistics developing a directive 
Higher level responsibilities to a force commander 
for strategic and operational in a high level conflict 
intelligence at international,situation, especially 
national and departmental command and control, 
levels intelligence and logistic 
Problem: consideration/ aspects. 
discussion 
Operational Level of War 
- Explanation/discussion 
Consideration of and 
presentation of following 
case studies: 
. American Civil War 
. Palestine 1918 
. Russia 1942-43 
. Bangladesh 1971 
. Fulda Gap 
- Preparation of concept of 
operations 
To expose participants 
to the high level 
considerations involved 
in the conduct of a 
campaign . 
'Strategic and Operational Study Period Exercise 
Instruction' (Headquarters Training Command, 
13 March 1984) 
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